Rawls's influence and counter-influence on Sen: Post-welfarism and impartiality

Gilardone, Muriel

doi:10.1080/09672567.2013.792365

Cited by 15 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…Public reasoning pertains to how agents take part in collective discussion of public concerns, and requires that the political rules are justifiable or acceptable to all. The importance of public reasoning has already been noted by other authors (Qizilbach 2007, Gilardone 2013, as has the fact that Sen's idea of justice is path-breaking (Peter 2012). To our knowledge, however, our paper is the first to suggest that this novel feature of Sen's contribution cannot be properly understood in the absence of a primary step that consists in demonstrating that the capability-centered view is misconceived.…”

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confidence: 41%

Sen is not a capability theorist

Baujard

Gilardone

2016

Journal of Economic Methodology

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Abstract:This paper aims to show that, contrary to the standard understanding of his work, Sen's idea of justice does not consist in the defense of a capability theory. Under the dominant capability-centered view, Sen's idea of justice is indeed characterized principally by a switch of focus from utility to capability. We demonstrate that this view amounts to the application of formal welfarism to capabilities. We reject this characterization and defend instead a heuristic account of the status of capability in Sen's thought: capability was introduced to make a point against welfarism, but this does not imply that a commitment to a capability theory. The capability-centered view is shown to be inconsistent with Sen's idea of justice, because the latter requires agents to be involved in the definition of their own welfare. Our study of the status of capability in Sen's view of justice enables us to relocate his main contribution and to build the basis for an alternative theory of justice. Keywords:Capability, welfarism, justice, operationalization, paternalism, agency, public reasoning JEL codes:Sen is not a capability theorist Abstract. This paper aims to show that, contrary to the standard understanding of his work, Sen's idea of justice does not consist in the defense of a capability theory. Under the dominant capabilitycentered view, Sen's idea of justice is indeed characterized principally by a switch of focus from utility to capability. We demonstrate that this view amounts to the application of formal welfarism to capabilities. We reject this characterization and defend instead a heuristic account of the status of capability in Sen's thought: capability was introduced to make a point against welfarism, but this does not imply that a commitment to a capability theory. The capability-centered view is shown to be inconsistent with Sen's idea of justice, because the latter requires agents to be involved in the definition of their own welfare. Our study of the status of capability in Sen's view of justice enables us to relocate his main contribution and to build the basis for an alternative theory of justice.

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confidence: 41%

Sen is not a capability theorist

Baujard

Gilardone

2016

Journal of Economic Methodology

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“…However, we show that this has no necessary relation to an application of the capability approach. 9 Note though that Gilardone (2015), in her study of Rawls's influence on Sen's idea of justice, shows that commentators have overrated the debate on the metric of justice, and underrated the debate on the definition of an impartial procedure for defining principles of justice. Satz (2011: 563) shows a rare insight in his remark that "Sen makes clear that capabilities are not the metric of justice".…”

Section: The Capability-theory View In Questionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…"While it is my contention that basic capability equality has certain clear advantages over other types of equality, I did not argue that the others were morally irrelevant" (Sen 1980: 219-220). As asserted by Gilardone (2015), this significant qualification has largely been overshadowed by the innovation constituted by the introduction of the capability dimension. This is certainly at the source of misunderstandings between Sen and many of his commentators, in particular regarding the place devoted to capability in his idea of justice.…”

Section: Arguments In Support Of the Heuristic View On Capabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Sen is Not a Capability Theorist

Baujard

Gilardone

2015

SSRN Journal

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According to the standard reading, Sen's contribution to justice consists in the defense of a capability theory, i.e. of a simple switch of focus from utility to capability. This paper aims to undermine this standard reading. We claim that this capability-theory view amounts to the application of formal welfarism to capabilities: social welfare is the aggregation of individual welfares, where welfare is properly defined by capabilities. We show that this view is inconsistent with Sen's idea of justice, because the latter requires agents to be involved in the definition of what should count for the evaluation of social states, and how it should count. The value attributed to agency in Sen's idea of justice is such that the process of choosing better policies trumps the substantive definition of what welfare should be. We defend instead a heuristic account of the status of capability in Sen's thought: capability was introduced to make a point against welfarism; it is an argumentative step that does not imply a definitive commitment to a capability theory. We conclude that a fruitful discussion of his alternative theory of justice requires that we relocate his main contribution: we should see it as pertaining to a theory of public reasoning, not a theory based on a specific material of justice.

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“…He nevertheless suggests that it may take us on an entire new continent, "but perhaps […] too far!" 5 For an exploration of the theoretical debate between the two philosophers and the progressive modification of Sen's theoretical ambition, seeGilardone 2015.…”

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confidence: 99%

Rawls's influence and counter-influence on Sen: Post-welfarism and impartiality

Cited by 15 publications

References 22 publications

Sen is not a capability theorist

Sen is not a capability theorist

Sen is Not a Capability Theorist

The Influence of Sen’s Applied Economics on His Non-welfarist Approach to Justice

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