Rawls's “Political” Philosophy and American Democracy

Klosko, George

doi:10.2307/2939045

Cited by 44 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…In particular, citizens' willingness to respect the beliefs of others "reasonably" and voluntarily seems to be much less assured than Rawls suggests. Various studies conducted during the preceding fifty years reveal that when push comes to shove, many individuals are publicly willing to declare certain seemingly "reasonable" views (as such are defined by Rawls) to be unacceptable and demand actions which abridge many of the "basic liberties" promoted by Rawlsian political liberalism (Klosko, 1993: 352; see also Klosko, 2000: 42-115). Indeed, it has been calculated that somewhere between 20 percent and 40 percent of the U.S. population, for example, affirms doctrines that would be incompatible with the demands of Rawls' conception (Klosko, 1996: 258-59; see also Klosko 2000).…”

Section: Being Reasonably Rationalmentioning

confidence: 99%

The (Un)Reasonableness of Rawlsian Rationality

Young¹

2005

South African Journal of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT:In Political Liberalism John Rawls argues that "the reasonable" and "the rational" are "two distinct and independent" ideas. This differentiation is essential to the viability of Rawls' conception of political liberalism insofar as it facilitates the recognition and subsequent voluntary acceptance of the need for a public conception of justice that requires all individuals to forsake the unfettered pursuit of their personal ambitions. However, the soundness of Rawls' argument is premised upon a number of questionable claims that, in effect, render his proposed distinction between the reasonable and the rational more chimerical than real, and in so doing critically undermine the ability of his conception of justice to secure the type of voluntary public consensus he deems necessary to establish and sustain a just and stable liberal democracy. It is concluded that the only way one can be assured of generating the sought after conditions is to develop a regulatory framework that publicly supports and protects the principles embodied in Rawls' conception of reasonableness, rather than relying upon the reasonableness of individuals to secure and nourish the required conditions.In Political Liberalism John Rawls (1993: 51) argues that "the reasonable" and "the rational" are "two distinct and independent" ideas. This differentiation is critical to the viability of his conception of political liberalism: It allows him to claim that individuals can effectively distinguish between what is "reasonable" and what is "rational," which, in turn, enables them to recognize the value and, indeed, necessity of adopting and supporting a public conception of justice 1 that requires all individuals to forsake the unfettered pursuit of their personal ambitions. Given the ineliminable diversity of reasonable moral, religious, and philosophical beliefs that characterizes contemporary liberal democracies-that is, the fact of reasonable pluralism-such recognition is essential if Rawlsian political liberalism is to provide for the establishment and preservation of the sociopolitical conditions necessary to secure and sustain a just and stable (in Rawlsian terms, well-ordered) liberal polity.However, the viability of Rawls' argument is premised upon a number of questionable claims that, in effect, render his proposed distinction between the reasonable and the rational more chimerical than real. In particular, when one penetrates the surface of Rawls' argument, it becomes clear that in a society governed by the principles of Rawlsian political liberalism a person's goals and related behavior can be considered genuinely rational only to the extent that they qualify as reasonable. If, as Rawls contends, a person's public behavior must be reasonable if it is to be legitimately accommodated, protected, and facilitated, then maximizing one's potential to achieve her *

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Section: Being Reasonably Rationalmentioning

confidence: 99%

The (Un)Reasonableness of Rawlsian Rationality

Young¹

2005

South African Journal of Philosophy

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“…Since 1975, in his subsequent interpretations and revisions of Theory, culminating in Political Liberalism (1996), Rawls has argued for a "political" conception of liberalism that does not endorse comprehensive moral doctrines, such as egalitarian liberalism, of which Theory stands as the finest statement. For appreciation of and critical engagement with Rawls, see, for example, Barry (1973), Freeman (2003), Hampton (1989), Klosko (1993), and Waldron (2002). PL in italic refers to Political Liberalism (1996).…”

Section: An Assessmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

The "Relative Universality" of Human Rights: An Assessment

On¹

2005

Perspect Global Dev Technol

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This essay makes an assessment of Jack Donnelly's model of overlapping consensus on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It raises key questions, such as: How to adjudicate competing rights; what is to become of "unreasonable" views; whence come reasonable views; and, beyond the obvious cases of slavery and genocide, how is the overlapping consensus obtained? While an alternative theory is not developed, a critical perspective is provided that might facilitate further inquiries.

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“…' Rawls (1993: 209). A critical version from the perspective of political legitimation is in Klosko (1993). 21.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cultural pluralism, nationalism and federalism: a revision of democratic citizenship in plurinational states

Requejo

1999

European J Political Res

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This article poses three questions related to the current revision of democratic citizenship in plurinational states. The first question focusses on the analytical limits of the term 'multicultural' and on the question of where nationalist movements stand within cultural pluralism. The second question asks whether it is possible to overcome the inherent difficulties in the traditional concept of liberal-democratic citizenship in plurinational states. Finally, the third question asks whether federalism is an adequate framework to regulate a revised concept of democratic citizenship in plurinational states. These three questions are developed in three sections. In the first I put forward a typology that allows us to identify four kinds of cultural pluralism movements that are present within the current liberal democracies. In the second section I identify some of the shortcomings of the traditional concept of citizenship with respect to the plurinational integration of some democracies, making special reference to the standard liberal version by Rawls. I defend the right of the minority liberal nationalisms to be included in a revision of the concept of democratic citizenship for the next century. Finally, I discuss the role of federalism, paying special attention to the case of Catalonia and Spain within Europe, and to possible 'asymmetrical' reforms to the concept of democratic citizenship.

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Rawls's “Political” Philosophy and American Democracy

Cited by 44 publications

References 36 publications

The (Un)Reasonableness of Rawlsian Rationality

The (Un)Reasonableness of Rawlsian Rationality

The "Relative Universality" of Human Rights: An Assessment

Cultural pluralism, nationalism and federalism: a revision of democratic citizenship in plurinational states

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