1996
DOI: 10.1007/s001990050115
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Rawlsian equity and generalised utilitarianism with an infinite population

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Cited by 18 publications
(33 citation statements)
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“…Finally, as illustrated by Rezai et al (2010), in some cases, such policies may benefit all generations, and thus do not represent a question of intergenerational justice. 2 For an alternative set of axioms leading to discounted utilitarianism, see Lauwers (1997). positive discount rate undermines the well-being of generations in far future, even if sustainable streams with non-decreasing well-being are feasible.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Finally, as illustrated by Rezai et al (2010), in some cases, such policies may benefit all generations, and thus do not represent a question of intergenerational justice. 2 For an alternative set of axioms leading to discounted utilitarianism, see Lauwers (1997). positive discount rate undermines the well-being of generations in far future, even if sustainable streams with non-decreasing well-being are feasible.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Lauwers [15] axiomatizes the in…mum rule using axioms very closely related to ours. He works in a completely ordinal framework; however.…”
Section: Alternative Axiomatizationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We refer to it as ordinal covariance. A variant of this axiom has been studied in this context before; see Lauwers [15]. It …nds a role in social choice theory in general, see for example [2,11,13,20,21];…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Finally, as illustrated by Rezai et al (2016), in some cases, such policies may benefit all generations, and thus do not represent a question of intergenerational justice. 2 For an alternative set of axioms leading to discounted utilitarianism, see Lauwers (1997). erations cannot lead to a less desirable stream of well-being if the present remains better-off than the future even after the sacrifice. 3 In Sect.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%