(Re)conceptualization of Memory in Ukraine after the Revolution of Dignity

Abstract

In Ukraine, having arrived at a critical stage of its history, three areas can be highlighted at the level of legislation during the struggle for the way forward since the end of 2013: the language issue, the constitutional process, and the efforts to eliminate the Soviet legacy. The subject of our analysis is the four laws belonging to the 2015 legislative package on decommunization, with an outlook to the broader context, as well. The four laws in question decide about who are heroes and who are enemies in history; what Ukraine's relationship is with World War II, as well as with the Communist and Nazi regimes. The laws point out fi rmly and excluding any further debate the primacy of the country's independence over all else, and the protection of the ideal of independence by any means concerning both the past and the present. The laws prescribe impeachment as a sanction for denying their contents. This story-hot memory infl uenced by politics-will be summarized for the period of 2015-2016.

From geopolitical fault-line to frontline city: changing attitudes to memory politics in Kharkiv under the Russo-Ukrainian war

“…The memory politics in post-Soviet Ukraine until the Revolution of Dignity in 2014 was deeply contradictory and oscillating between competing ideologically charged narratives of the past (Shevel, O. 2011;Fedinec, C. and Csernicsko, I. 2017).…”

“…Due to different historical backgrounds of the different parts of the country, the divide between controversial and hardly irreconcilable Ukraine-centric and pro-Soviet/pro-Russian narratives had its regional dimension, expressed in well-known formula "two Ukraines" (a nationally-conscious (western) Ukraine and a pro-Russian "creole" eastern Ukraine), exploited and artificially enhanced by both pro-Russian politicians in Ukraine and Russian propaganda (Portnov, A. 2013;Fedinec, C. and Csernicsko, I. 2017;Kuzio, T. 2019).…”

Double Marginalisation of the Communist Party: Ukraine’s Decommunisation and the Russian-Backed Rebellion in Donbas

“…Many KPU members and their supporters organised voluntary groups to protect the Lenin statues in the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk provinces in late February 2014, because as a culmination of the post-communist transition, Euromaidan brought about the so-called Leninfall, the spontaneous destruction of monuments to Lenin (Olszański 2017). The revolutionary period between November 2013 and February 2014 swept away more than five hundred Lenin statues in the central, southern and eastern parts of Ukraine (Fedinec & Csernicsko 2017). The removal of the remaining statues of Lenin has been of great importance.…”

“…The parliamentary faction of the Communist Party was disbanded before in July 2014 by means of a procedural process. At the same time, based on a prosecution submission, legal proceedings began against the party (Fedinec & Csernicsko 2017). Petro Symonenko declared that he would appeal to the European Court of Human Rights to reverse the decision but was unable to get an appeal ratified by the Ukrainian court system.…”

Felosztás vagy felemelkedés? Ukrajna, Európa „nagy tortája”

“…Mindez először a Kijevben, majd az ország számos nagyvárosában meginduló tiltakozássorozatba, az ún. euromajdanba, illetve 2014 februárjában az utólag a "méltóság forradalmaként" (Åslund 2015;Fedinec, Csernicskó 2017a) aposztrofált fegyveres összetűzésbe torkollott, végül Janukovics elnök megbuktatásához vezetett. A kijevi események megítélése Nyugaton is eltérő.…”