Re-election and political career paths in the Uruguayan Congress, 1985–99

Altman, David; Chasquetti, Daniel

doi:10.1080/13572330500158656

Cited by 26 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…5 0.0137). This finding is consistent with previous studies demonstrating that senior incumbents are re-elected time after time (Altman and Chasquetti 2005;Cain et al 1987;Cunningham 1971;Erikson 1972;Heitshusen et al 2005;Krashinsky and Milne 1986). We did not find any significant difference in the productivity of junior and senior members of the Knesset.…”

Section: Government and Oppositionsupporting

confidence: 95%

Re-election: Different Skills for Different Roles

Akirav¹

2013

Gov. & oppos.

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The current research examines the ability of legislators to be re-elected through fulfilling their three roles: legislation, oversight and representation. This study also re-examines Mayhew's claim (1974) that most legislators are motivated by a desire to be re-elected, and that this desire drives their legislative activity through its utility in advertising, credit claiming and position taking. We argue that the skills required for selection and re-election are different from those required for enacting legislation. Thus, we distinguish between two types of legislators – those who are electable and those who are successful in the legislature.

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Section: Government and Oppositionsupporting

confidence: 95%

Re-election: Different Skills for Different Roles

Akirav¹

2013

Gov. & oppos.

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“…However, in recent decades, several institutional and political events (constitutional reform, decentralization, and temporal detachment of federal and subnational elections) affected the incentives that political actors face in making their career decisions. Even though the rates of reelection seekers have remained quite stable since the nineties (Altman and Chasquetti ), subnational executive posts ( intendentes at the Department level, synonyms of state governors) became increasingly attractive public offices, creating opportunities and benefits for a new kind of career path: progressively ambitious legislators. The interesting question that comes out here is what the behavioral implications of increased subnational ambition are.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Subnational Connection in Unitary Regimes: Progressive Ambition and Legislative Behavior inUruguay

Chasquetti

Micozzi

2014

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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How do legislators develop reputations to further their individual goals in environments with limited space for personalization? In this article, we evaluate congressional behavior by legislators with gubernatorial expectations in a unitary environment where parties control political activities and institutions hinder individualization. By analyzing the process of drafting bills in Uruguay, we demonstrate that deputies with subnational executive ambition tend to bias legislation towards their districts, especially those from small and peripheral units. Findings reinforce the importance of incorporating ambition to legislative studies and open a new direction towards the analysis of multiple career patterns within a specific case.

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“…These collective institutions of government arose in different institutional settings and had to get along with different types of legislatures. While the Swiss legislature is a non-standing body with a militia structure featuring unprofessional and unpaid legislators who seldom meet for congressional sessions (Kobach 1993), in Uruguay the legislature is a professional body, maybe one of the strongest in Latin America, and has important tools for controlling the Executive (Altman and Chasquetti 2005). Of course, the nature of the relationship between the executive and legislative powers lies at the core of the regime discussion.…”

Section: Executive Collegiatementioning

confidence: 99%

Collegiate Executives and Direct Democracy in Switzerland and Uruguay: Similar Institutions, Opposite Political Goals, Distinct Results

Altman¹

2008

Swiss Political Sci Review

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Uruguay, defining itself as the “Switzerland of Latin America”, took the Swiss model (collegial executives and direct democracy) as an example when building its own political institutions. Despite the similarities of these institutions, the results were quite different due to the different context. The comparison between the institutions in these two isolated countries highlights the ways in which the same institutions may produce different results and evolve in distinctive ways. This is important to recognize as foreign models and experiences continue to inspire policies. Contrary to common arguments presented in the literature, even in such a “most likely case”, institutions cannot simply be copied. Institutional effects are context‐dependent and we need to pay attention to this interaction. This article provides new evidence showing that universalist institutional arguments can be misleading.

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Re-election and political career paths in the Uruguayan Congress, 1985–99

Cited by 26 publications

References 3 publications

Re-election: Different Skills for Different Roles

Re-election: Different Skills for Different Roles

The Subnational Connection in Unitary Regimes: Progressive Ambition and Legislative Behavior inUruguay

Collegiate Executives and Direct Democracy in Switzerland and Uruguay: Similar Institutions, Opposite Political Goals, Distinct Results

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