Re‐evaluation of decision alternatives dependent upon the reversibility of a decision and the passage of time

Frey, Dieter; Kumpf, Martin; Irle, Martin; Gniech, Gisla

doi:10.1002/ejsp.2420140410

Cited by 33 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…In Study 1, satisficers were more satisfied with their selection of a poster when it was a permanent choice rather than a changeable one, consistent with results obtained in several other studies of decision reversibility (Bullens et al, 2012;Frey et al, 1984;Gilbert & Ebert, 2002). In contrast, maximizers showed the opposite pattern: Maximizers were more satisfied with their selection when it was a reversible rather than an irreversible choice.…”

Section: Summary and Concluding Discussionsupporting

confidence: 90%

“…These findings led to the provocative conclusion that, although people may prefer reversible decisions, they achieve greater satisfaction when their selections are permanent. This pattern has been found in some (Bullens et al, 2012;Frey, Kumpf, Irle, & Gniech, 1984), but not all other studies (Lowe & Steiner, 1968).…”

Section: The Effects Of Decision Reversibilitymentioning

confidence: 59%

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Maximizers, Satisficers, and Their Satisfaction With and Preferences for Reversible Versus Irreversible Decisions

Shiner

2015

Social Psychological and Personality Science

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Previous research on decision reversibility has found that, although people believe they prefer reversible decisions, irreversible decisions yield the most satisfaction. Two studies investigated whether these findings are moderated by individuals' tendencies toward maximizing (decision making via extensive search for the best option) versus satisficing (decision making via less exhaustive search and less optimizing). Study 1 found that satisficers were more satisfied following an irreversible decision about a poster choice, whereas maximizers were more satisfied following a reversible decision. When a different group of participants in Study 2 were asked whether they would prefer the reversible or irreversible versions of Study 1, satisficers disproportionately chose the irreversible version, and maximizers disproportionately chose the reversible version; however, some extreme maximizers preferred the irreversible version as a means of preventing needless worry or second guessing. The results demonstrate that individual differences are likely to moderate even robust patterns of decision making and affective forecasting.

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Section: Summary and Concluding Discussionsupporting

confidence: 90%

Section: The Effects Of Decision Reversibilitymentioning

confidence: 59%

Maximizers, Satisficers, and Their Satisfaction With and Preferences for Reversible Versus Irreversible Decisions

Shiner

2015

Social Psychological and Personality Science

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“…The degree of commitment to the goal, as approximated by its goal attention level (Figure 3), with goals moving up (towards attended) increasing utility and moving down (towards impossible) reducing utility. This is consistent with the observed psychological phenomenon of preference increasing as choices become increasingly irreversible (Frey, Kumpf, Irle, & Gniech, 1984;Gilbert, 2007, p. 183-184). This effect could also lead to the observed phenomenon of increased effort being applied towards goals that are approaching completion (e.g., Nunes & Drèze, 2006).…”

Section: Learning Architecture Of the Utility Functionsupporting

confidence: 87%

A Psychologically Plausible Goal-Based Utility Function

Gill

2008

InformingSciJ

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Utility is a concept that is central to economics, finance, and decision theory. In the informing sciences, it also plays a central role: that of explaining the client's motivation to be informed. Unfortunately, existing economic models of utility are plagued by many anomalies when applied to individual clients and also fail to incorporate many important features that are relevant to informing contexts, such as the desire for mastery and learning. The present paper draws upon goal setting theory and cognitive psychology to propose an alternative view of utility that is better adapted to informing situations. It further proposes that in a given task setting, an individual's utility function will evolve with experience, from satisfying loose generic goals into a highly compiled task progress monitoring function. During the course of this evolution, the client will pass through a phase where utility is heavily determined by progress towards specific task goals. The implications of this more psychologically plausible model of utility for informing systems are discussed.

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“…The studies typically compare preference changes between two or more conditions with different experimental manipulations (e.g., choice importance, choice reversibility, etc. ; e.g., Brehm, 1956; Brehm and Cohen, 1959; Deutsch et al, 1962; Brock, 1963; Walster et al, 1967; Greenwald, 1969; Brehm and Jones, 1970; Brehm and Wicklund, 1970; Gordon and Glass, 1970; Walster and Walster, 1970; Converse and Cooper, 1979; Olson and Zanna, 1979, 1982; Gerard and White, 1983; Frey et al, 1984; Steele et al, 1993; Heine and Lehman, 1997; Lyubomirsky and Ross, 1999; Lieberman et al, 2001; Harmon-Jones and Harmon-Jones, 2002; Kitayama et al, 2004; Hoshino-Browne et al, 2005; Harmon-Jones et al, 2008; Imada and Kitayama, 2010; Lee and Schwarz, 2010). In these studies, results on relative difference in preference change between experimental conditions might be valid as the level of noise (and thus preference change explained by the artifact) should be no different across conditions as long as participants were randomly assigned into each experimental condition.…”

Section: How Does the Problem Affect Past Findings?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Choice-Induced Preference Change in the Free-Choice Paradigm: A Critical Methodological Review

Izuma¹,

Murayama²

2013

Front. Psychology

107

130

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Choices not only reflect our preference, but they also affect our behavior. The phenomenon of choice-induced preference change has been of interest to cognitive dissonance researchers in social psychology, and more recently, it has attracted the attention of researchers in economics and neuroscience. Preference modulation after the mere act of making a choice has been repeatedly demonstrated over the last 50 years by an experimental paradigm called the “free-choice paradigm.” However, Chen and Risen (2010) pointed out a serious methodological flaw in this paradigm, arguing that evidence for choice-induced preference change is still insufficient. Despite the flaw, studies using the traditional free-choice paradigm continue to be published without addressing the criticism. Here, aiming to draw more attention to this issue, we briefly explain the methodological problem, and then describe simple simulation studies that illustrate how the free-choice paradigm produces a systematic pattern of preference change consistent with cognitive dissonance, even without any change in true preference. Our stimulation also shows how a different level of noise in each phase of the free-choice paradigm independently contributes to the magnitude of artificial preference change. Furthermore, we review ways of addressing the critique and provide a meta-analysis to show the effect size of choice-induced preference change after addressing the critique. Finally, we review and discuss, based on the results of the stimulation studies, how the criticism affects our interpretation of past findings generated from the free-choice paradigm. We conclude that the use of the conventional free-choice paradigm should be avoided in future research and the validity of past findings from studies using this paradigm should be empirically re-established.

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Re‐evaluation of decision alternatives dependent upon the reversibility of a decision and the passage of time

Cited by 33 publications

References 7 publications

Maximizers, Satisficers, and Their Satisfaction With and Preferences for Reversible Versus Irreversible Decisions

Maximizers, Satisficers, and Their Satisfaction With and Preferences for Reversible Versus Irreversible Decisions

A Psychologically Plausible Goal-Based Utility Function

Choice-Induced Preference Change in the Free-Choice Paradigm: A Critical Methodological Review

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