Re-thinking Myanmar's political regime: military rule in Myanmar and implications for current reforms

Abstract

The Myanmar military has long dominated national politics as well as the state apparatus since first coming into power in 1958. Despite a series of challenges to its rule, the military has been able to constantly re-invent itself while re-asserting its dominance over society. Cycles of popular protests and dissatisfaction with military rule have not led to regime change nor weakened the military as a unified institution. The latest incarnation of the nominally civilian government has introduced a series of liberalising reforms that have dramatically opened more socio-political space for opposition and non-state actors to participate in national politics. Despite the somewhat optimistic outlook of a more liberalised Myanmar in the future, the institutional design and historical legacy of the military's role in state-building have ensured that it has enough 'reserve domains' to maintain its prominent role within any foreseeable future governments in Myanmar. By tracing the historical development of the Myanmar military regime, this paper argues that current reforms were introduced as a strategy for the military to ensure its continued survival as the primary political actor in Myanmar.

Democratization in the Global South: From democratic transitions to transformative democratic politics

“…This created a discursive and political divide between what was portrayed as engagement‐oriented soft‐liners and engagement‐averse hardliners (Pedersen, ; Stokke, Vakulchuk, & Øverland, ). On the other hand, an alternative discourse has gained ground in recent years and portrays Myanmar's democratic opening as a military strategy to institutionalize a hybrid form of rule, in order to maintain political stability and military power with increased domestic and international legitimacy (Bünte, ; Huang, ; L. Jones, ). A core element in this strategy is the military‐designed 2008 Constitution, which provides a framework for a unitary state with formal democracy and guaranteed positions of power for the military in parliamentary politics, government, and public administration (Egreteau, ).…”

Political Transition in Myanmar: Prospects and Problems

“…At least as, if not more, importantly, while the Hluttaw is the state's legislative body and oversees its day to day affairs, it constitutionally occupies a position below what amounts to Myanmar's supreme arbitrating body, as well as the core cabinet, the National Defense and Security Council (NDSC). The NDSC was announced the day after the swearing in of the new government in April 2011, which assumed parliamentary authority from the SPDC and which ushered in Myanmar's apparent “transition.” The NDSC has, in effect, assumed the SPDC's mantle as the final arbiter on Myanmar's political processes (see also Huang, ). This then reflects Valenzuala's first, as well as fifth, point concerning the removal—or lack of removal—of the previous regime.…”

Expected but Permanent? : The Tatmadaw’s Continued Political Involvement in Myanmar

“…The 2011 transfer of power to a new political system not directly under its rule is not the first time the Tatmadaw has pursued such a project; but the opening of the political arena, via a multi-party electoral structure, to those outside the traditional power base is a precedent for a military which has historically closely determined who rules and by what methods. Despite such inclusion (specifically various entities which have for decades been labeled enemies of the state and persecuted by security services), the constitutional stipulations and powers bestowed upon the Tatmadaw cast doubt in many that this transition is nothing more than the institutionalization of military rule in its latest form (Huang, 2013).…”