Reading bedtime stories to compatriots: Reconciling global equality of opportunity and self-determination

Abstract

In this article, we propose a reconciliation between global equality of opportunity and self-determination, two central and seemingly conflicting principles in the contemporary theory of global justice. Our conception of reconciliation draws on the family-people analogy, following the account of familial relationship goods, developed by Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, on permissible parental partiality and domestic equality of opportunity. We argue, first, that a plausible conception of global equality of opportunity must be able to distinguish morally arbitrary aspects of nationality that require mitigation from morally permissible ones. Second, we argue that a plausible criterion for the distinction integrates a person’s normative interests over a lifetime: (i) the interests of a child born into societal circumstances that impact her life prospects; and (ii) the interests of an adult citizen in collective self-determination. Third, we outline an account of ‘people relationship goods’, as a principled way to circumscribe the permissible scope of self-determination. Fair global equality of opportunity requires mitigating nationality-tracking inequalities, except those that fall within the permissible scope of collective self-determination.

A non‐European European Union

“…19 I assume here a Rawlsian institutional account of distributive justice where natural rights and duties are very limited (Rawls, 1971) 20 For another case that illustrates the point, think of how we determine entitlements of family units and how we deal with inheritance tax. What families are entitled to "keep" is determined by the interest individuals have in being members of family units but also by concerns of fairness and equality (see Brighouse & Swift, 2008 and for the analogy to states see Banai & Kollar, 2019). 21 The critic cannot, in response, appeal to demands of fairness or reciprocity to say that the surplus belongs to those who contribute to its production.…”

“…20 20 For another case that illustrates the point, think of how we determine entitlements of family units and how we deal with inheritance tax. What families are entitled to “keep” is determined by the interest individuals have in being members of family units but also by concerns of fairness and equality (see Brighouse & Swift, 2008 and for the analogy to states see Banai & Kollar, 2019). …”

“…The most plausible accounts of self‐determination ground it in the interest that individuals have to live in politically autonomous communities that they can shape (Stilz, 2019, pp. 104–115; Banai & Kollar, 2019). Importantly, individuals’ interest in political autonomy requires international action to be secured—both in terms of protecting states from external interference that undermine such autonomy and in guaranteeing that states have the requisite resources to form stable domestic institutions (Amighetti & Harb, 2019; Laborde & Ronzoni, 2016).…”

Crisis Nationalism: To What Degree Is National Partiality Justifiable during a Global Pandemic?

“…We turn now to arguments that partial duties are non-reductively relational in that they are intrinsic to some ideal of a relationship. 10 For instance, on the relational approach, friends have special duties to each other not because this is an efficient way of realizing impartial goods, or because some impartial ideal of cooperation warrants it, but because it is definitive of what it means to be in an ideal friendship (Miller 1995 , 2007 ; Moore, 2001 , 2015 ; Scheffler 2001 , 2018 ; Lazar, 2010 , 2016 ; Banai and Kollar 2019 ). With respect to national partiality, relational theorists argue that special concern for conationals is intrinsic to the ideal of conationality.…”

The EU's role in income redistribution and insurance: Support, norm‐setter or provider? A review of justice‐based arguments

“…“Collective authorship” is a relevant consideration of justice in this respect. Banai and Kollar (2019) present an account of global equality of opportunity with a permissible scope for collective self‐determination. Rather than giving “logical priority” to global distributive justice over domestic distributive justice, they reason in terms of the mutual accommodation of self‐determination and global equality of opportunity.…”