Reading Clausewitz, reimagining the practice of strategy

Abstract

Strategy and organization theory enjoy a reawakening interest in historical analysis. In this essay we suggest that this engagement should include strategy's linkage to the history of military strategy. We develop our argument through an exegesis of Carl von Clausewitz' treatise On War. We claim that Clausewitz' theorization of strategy advances the ongoing scholarly conversation on the practice of strategy in three specific ways. First, he defines a distinctive locus for the notion of strategy as the bridge between policy and tactics; in so doing he addresses what has been criticized as strategy's conceptual drift. Second, with Clausewitz we can pose the question of strategy's effectiveness in a critical, reflexive way. This opens up a way to answer the "so-what" question that has hampered strategy as practice research. Third, as an educator in military affairs of the Crown Prince, Clausewitz invites reflection on strategy's pedagogy. Following Clausewitz, strategy may not want to concern itself with distilling the next practice from past history; but immerse strategy students in great detail in history in order to develop their critical faculties.

Lost but Found: Bringing Strategy Practice Back into Strategy Teaching

“…These developments are in opposition to the original conceptions of strategy teaching that privileged inductive, open-ended, problem solving approaches to learning (Bower, 2008) that also encouraged reflective practices and the strategists fine-tuned judgment as reliant on his/her sensibility and decisiveness (Kornberger & Engberg-Pedersen, 2021). Indeed, strategic management theory and analytical concepts are not inherently capable of carrying the burden of developing strategic thinkers (Mintzberg, 2004)-they need to be "complemented by judgment, insight, intuition, creativity, and social and communicative skills" (Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2018: 322), competencies that are acquired from deliberate teaching and learning practice.…”

Interdiscursive struggles: Managing the co‐existence of the conventional and open strategy discourse

“…Emerging from military practice (Kornberger & Engberg-Pedersen, 2021), the conventional strategy discourse is based on the root metaphors of military and top-down (Knights & Morgan, 1991); as such, the strategy practices of the conventional discourse are oriented to the imagery of the military and top-down, even though there is a great degree of variation in how literally and extremely this is enacted. In contrast, the main root metaphors of the open strategy discourse are wisdom of the crowd and democratization, which have been linked to its roots in Open Innovation (Dobusch & Kapeller, 2018;Malhotra et al, 2017;Stieger et al, 2012).…”

A model of cultural intelligence based on knowledge management practices and military intelligence: A comparative study between Moldova and Ukraine

“…Despite such a shared intellectual and practical heritages, work in organizational intelligence and Military Intelligence have developed in separation, with surprisingly little interaction. It is only recently that organizational strategy scholars have started to engage more substantially with Military Intelligence literature (Munro, 2010;Kornberger, 2013;Mackay and Zundel, 2017;Kornberger and Engberg-Pedersen, 2021). Kornberger and Vaara (2021), by elaborating on the intersections of organizational and Military Intelligence research, they seek to open up avenues for a further dialogue between military and organizational intelligence.…”