Reading Hurricane Katrina: Information Sources and Decision‐making in Response to a Natural Disaster

Abstract

In this paper we analyze results from 114 face-to-face qualitative interviews of people who had evacuated from the New Orleans area in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, interviews that were completed within weeks of the 2005 storm in most cases. Our goal was to understand the role information and knowledge played in people's decisions to leave the area. Contrary to the conventional wisdom underlying many disaster communication studies, we found that our interviewees almost always had extensive storm-related information from a variety of sources, including media reports and (in many cases) other background knowledge gleaned from experiences with previous storms, often from interpersonal sources. However, consistent with a theme in communication research that has been identifiable since at least the 1940s, interpersonal communication networks were most often what ultimately caused these individuals to act on this information, and therefore those with "weak ties" (a concept borrowed from sociology) to the broader "mainstream" community may have been disadvantaged, slower to leave, and thus more vulnerable to the storm's main effects. From our evidence, the end result was less a function of discrimination as it was one of differential activation of a relevant social network. These results argue for the rejection of a "deficit model" that assumes varied reactions to natural disaster result from some kind of an information deficiency, and remind us that behavior under such circumstances is the result of a process of collective behavior, not only individual cognition.

Improving Storm Surge Risk Communication: Stakeholder Perspectives

“…They typically turn first to their local television station for information and then seek confirmation from other sources such as national television stations, cable weather stations, websites, and social networks (Dash and Gladwin 2007;Zhang et al 2007;Lazo et al 2009;Taylor et al 2009;Morss and Hayden 2010;Sherman-Morris et al 2014). The main strategy for protection from storm surge is moving out of harm 's way ahead of the storm.…”

Creation and Communication of Hurricane Risk Information

“…Our analysis indicated that the partnerships within the hurricane warning system are generally successful, in that each group plays a unique and critical role and that, together, the groups make information about hurricane threats widely available (Taylor et al 2009;Morss and Hayden 2010). As one NHC forecaster noted, "It's amazing when you sit down and look at everything that could go wrong, and yet 99-pointsome percent of the time, the forecasts go out on time.…”

“…Information about geographical areas at high risk from hurricanes is also improving, for example, through updated mapping, advances in storm surge modeling, and more precise determination of evacuation zones (Rappaport et al 2009; Florida Division of Emergency Management 2011). Moreover, social science research is developing a growing understanding of the factors that contribute to people's hurricane preparation and evacuation decision making (Dow and Cutter 1998;Dash and Morrow 2001;Gladwin et al 2001;Gladwin and Morrow 2005;Dash and Gladwin 2007;Zhang et al 2007;Taylor et al 2009;Lazo et al 2010;Morss and Hayden 2010). Here we complement these efforts by examining the starting point of the warning and response process-that is, how information about forecasts, warnings, and recommended protective actions is created and communicated when a hurricane threatens.…”

“…First, their primary emphasis is generating and providing forecast information that, at best, can only inform and promote the protective actions needed to save lives and reduce harm. Second, many audiences, excepting the media and emergency managers, do not directly receive information from NWS forecasters; much of the NWS information received by others (e.g., the public) is filtered through the private sector, especially radio and television, or through interpersonal sources (e.g., Taylor et al 2009;Morss and Hayden 2010). Third, NWS forecasters' primary training is in meteorology, not in forecast communication or use, so the primary expertise they contribute is in the physical sciences.…”

Dynamic Simulation as an Approach to Understanding Hurricane Risk Response: Insights from the Stormview Lab

“…(20)(21)(22)(23) Because residents' memories are likely to be imperfect, we currently know far less than we would like to about the dynamics of how information search patterns change over time during the course of storm threats, the kinds of information that serve to trigger decisions to take protective action, and how these dynamics vary across individuals. Perhaps most critically, we also have little basis for answering important counterfactual questions about how levels of preparedness might be different if alternative kinds of information were provided to residents.…”