2020
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3523909
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Real Effects of Public Country-by-Country Reporting and the Firm Structure of European Banks

Abstract: European regulation mandates public country-by-country reporting for banks and is expected to increase costs of tax haven activities. We hand-collect data from IFRS consolidation scopes for European banks and test whether the availability of additional public information on banks' global activity reduces their tax haven presence. In a difference-indifference analysis, we find that indeed tax haven presence has declined significantly after the introduction of mandatory public country-by-country reporting for Eu… Show more

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Cited by 12 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…In addition to previous studies, we show that the response to public CbCR depends on the individual exposure of a firm and that only exposed firms reduce their tax avoidance. Our findings are also in line with recent work by Eberhartinger et al (2020), who document a declining number of banks' affiliates in tax havens since the introduction of public CbCR.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 93%
“…In addition to previous studies, we show that the response to public CbCR depends on the individual exposure of a firm and that only exposed firms reduce their tax avoidance. Our findings are also in line with recent work by Eberhartinger et al (2020), who document a declining number of banks' affiliates in tax havens since the introduction of public CbCR.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 93%
“…A few recent studies analyze the effectiveness of Article 89 of the CRD IV. They document that EU banks adapted their tax avoidance behavior to some extent (Joshi et al, 2020;Overesch & Wolff, 2020) and reduced their presence in tax havens (Eberhartinger et al, 2020) in response to CbCR. However, the findings of Dutt, Ludwig et al (2019) suggest an overall zero response of the capital market to the introduction of the disclosure obligation.…”
Section: Which Containsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…(2020) document a decline in income shifting by financial affiliates, but find that the magnitude of corporate tax avoidance at bank group level did not change materially. Concerning real effects, Eberhartinger et al (2020) observe a reduction in European banks' presence in tax havens, especially in so-called Dot Havens and tax havens where financial secrecy is high. With regard to the confidential CbCR for large multinational firms established by the OECD for financial years starting on or after 1 January 2016 (OECD, 2015), Hugger (2020) and Joshi (2020) document that the effective tax rates of firms subject to the disclosure requirement increase in response to the CbCR introduction and that the extent of profit shifting declines.…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Several studies investigate both public and non-public CbCR and its real effects (R. J. Brown, 2018;Dutt, Ludwig, Nicolay, Vay, & Voget, 2019;Eberhartinger, Speitmann, & Sureth-Sloane, 2020;Joshi, Outslay, & Persson, 2020;Overesch & Wolff, 2017;Simone & Olbert, 2019). While it is known that the information disclosed through CbCR is potentially misleading none of these studies scrutinizes the extend to which misperception impedes transparency and generates undesired implications.…”
Section: Corporate Tax Misperceptionmentioning
confidence: 99%