Realism after Ukraine: A Critique of Geopolitical Reason from Monroe to Mearsheimer

Abstract

This article seeks to historicize both the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the debate on realism occasioned by Russian aggression in Ukraine since 2014. Using the research of Gerard Toal on Russia’s construction of its security interests in the post-Soviet spaces that include Ukraine, the article argues that neorealist geopolitical explanations fail to do justice to the roles of contingency and culture in setting Russia’s so-called ‘red lines.’ It also identifies an agency problem in realism: realists not only fail to do justice to the agency of small states like Ukraine in this conflict but elide the moral and practical agency of decisionmakers like Russian President Vladmir Putin. The article also suggests that the current realism debate is the tip of an iceberg: realism has long had a problem specifying the relation of its theory to its practice. The article concludes by discussing the long shadow of 19th century imperial history over contemporary discussions of spheres of influence and great power status.

Instituciones independientes y policrisis

“…Hay una parte, solo una parte, de cierto en todo ello: los idealistas de entonces como los de ahora, eran, en realidad élites periféricas que pretendían prosperar a la sombra de un imperio cuya existencia negaban. En la tercera década del sxxi han precipitado en torno a un país imaginario -Ucrania- (Specter, 2022). Las perspectivas de éxito son exactamente las que les ofrezca el paraguas del imperio que también niegan.…”

Of tanks and tankies: What's ‘left’ for geography after the invasion of Ukraine

“…More than 12 months have passed since Russian tanks rolled into Ukraine, initiating a military campaign that is likely to have already left hundreds of thousands dead. Some believe the war has a genocidal quality (Snyder, 2022). Few question that Russia has slid into its own brand of fascism (Laruelle, 2022).…”

“…His map is probably intended as a corrective to a dominant media narrative that depicts the war as one of Russian imperial aggression only. Yet the analysis slips too easily into its own form of geopolitics and struggles to distinguish itself from a realist interpretation (Specter, 2022). Critical geopolitical interventions would certainly do well to differentiate themselves from those who simply restate the Kremlin line and render Russia's war a mere response to US foreign policy and cultural divisions in Ukraine (for a particularly crass example by a geographer, complete with authoritative Stalin quotes, see Dunford, 2023).…”