Realism and the absence of rivals

Abstract

Among the most serious challenges to scientific realism are arguments for the underdetermination of theory by evidence. This paper defends a version of scientific realism against what is perhaps the most influential recent argument of this sort, viz. Kyle Stanford's New Induction over the History of Science. An essential part of the defense consists in a probabilistic analysis of the slogan "absence of evidence is not evidence of absence". On this basis it is argued that the likelihood of a theory being underdetermined depends crucially on social and historical factors, such as the structure of scientific communities and the time that has passed since the theory first became accepted. This is then shown to serve as the epistemological foundation for a version of scientific realism which avoids Stanford's New Induction in a principled and non-question-begging way.

Abductive Reasoning in Science

“…3-5). It should be noted that Stanford is not focusing on IBE specifically, and that Stanford refers to the problem he is concerned with as the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives (for discussion, see, e.g., Magnus, 2010;Ruhmkorff, 2011;Egg, 2016;Dellsén, 2017d). 40 A somewhat similar problem faces what I have called constraining probabilistic accounts.…”

“…Specifically, as empirical evidence for the hypothesis accumulates, it gradually increases the plausibility that no alternative to it could explain all that evidence in an equally satisfactory manner. In addition, repeated unsuccessful attempts to formulate alternative hypotheses that provide better explanations also increase the plausibility that the tentatively accepted hypothesis cannot be matched in that regard (Dawid et al, 2015;Dellsén, 2017d). If all goes well, then eventually we will have accumulated enough information of these two types so as to make it exceedingly plausible that the hypothesis in question is "good enough" to be inferred.…”

Underdetermination in science: What it is and why we should care

“…The first line of criticism holds that the cases of Transient Underdetermination that Stanford lists in the New Induction are unrepresentative of the history of science and consequently do not give us reason to think that our current theories are transiently underdetermined by the evidence available to us. Finnur Dellsén (forthcoming) and Peter Godfrey‐Smith () argue that it is unlikely that science is currently in a state of transient underdetermination since Stanford's cases in the New Induction come from periods in the history of science in which we should expect that theories proposed would be later replaced by more successful theories, while the contemporary practice of science justifies no such expectation. The second line of criticism, put forward by Peter Godfrey‐Smith (), Anjan Chakravartty (), and Michael Devitt () among others, holds that Stanford's use of Transient Underdetermination does not provide as convincing a critique of scientific realism as Stanford intends it to.…”

Presume It Not: True Causes in the Search for the Basis of Heredity

“…This is distinct from the argument that the structure of contemporary scientific communities mitigates the problem of unconceived alternatives (cf. Godfrey-Smith [2008];Ruhmkorff [2011];Dellsén [2016]; seeStanford [2015] for a rejoinder). That argument is compatible with ours: where both arguments apply, communities will be double-buffered against Stanford's problem.…”