2015
DOI: 10.1007/s11023-015-9366-x
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Realization Relations in Metaphysics

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Cited by 26 publications
(15 citation statements)
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“…Realization is a relation that holds between higher-level properties and lower-level properties (Baysan (2015); Wilson and Craver (2006)). According to a popular line of thought in philosophy of mind, psychological states or properties such as believing that it is raining, having a taste for anchovies or having a pain are realized by physical states.…”
Section: The Multiple Realization Argumentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Realization is a relation that holds between higher-level properties and lower-level properties (Baysan (2015); Wilson and Craver (2006)). According to a popular line of thought in philosophy of mind, psychological states or properties such as believing that it is raining, having a taste for anchovies or having a pain are realized by physical states.…”
Section: The Multiple Realization Argumentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Wilson (2017) and Wasserman (2015), respectively. For an overview of the literature on functional and mereological realization, see Baysan (2015). (For realization aficionados, I'm open to the idea that there are still other forms of realization, such as subset realization as characterized by Wilson (1999) and others, and that these likewise count as metaphysical determination relations in my sense.)…”
Section: Grounding Mechanismsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…On this understanding, if physicalism is true, insofar as x is a bearer of a physical realizer of a mental property M, there isn't anything that needs to be added to the intrinsic properties of x to make it the case that x has M. Thanks to taking realization as a metaphysical necessitation relation, we can easily distinguish a realization-based version of non-reductive physicalism from some non-physicalist views which also hold that mental property instances are brought about by physical property instances where such bringing-about holds only contingently.2 It 1 See Baysan (2015) for discussion of different accounts of realization.…”
Section: ***mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…5 See Horgan (1982), Lewis (1983), Kim (1984). 6 See Morris (2010), Gibb (2014) and Baysan (2015) for related discussion. 7 See Baysan (2016, 386).…”
Section: ***mentioning
confidence: 99%