Reappraising the Chinese School of International Relations: A postcolonial perspective

Abstract

This article aims to revisit the enterprise of the Chinese School (CS) of IR and discuss how it should be viewed and handled in the discipline, specifically from within the analytical framework of the power/resistance nexus put forward by Foucault, Bhabha, and Spivak. The argument of this article is twofold. Firstly, the CS attempts to reinvigorate traditional Chinese concepts (that is, humane authority, the Tianxia system, and relationality), which mimick Western mainstream IR. These concepts channel the CS into a realist notion of power, a liberal logic of cosmopolitanism, and a constructivist idea of relationality. Thus, the CS uses against the West concepts and themes that the West currently use against the non-Western world. Nevertheless, as the second part of the argument will demonstrate, the enterprise of the CS can still be justified because it can be regarded as a reverse discourse; mimicking yet altering the original meanings of the taken-for-granted concepts, ideas, and principles used by mainstream IR scholars. Moreover, with the judicious use of strategic essentialism, the CS can potentially be one local group in a wider effort to contest diffused and decentred forms of Western domination through linking various struggles to form a unified ‘counter-hegemonic bloc’ of post-Western IR in the discipline.

Еволуција Кинеске Безбедносне Политике Кроз Призму Институционалног Ангажмана Комунистичке Партије Кине

“…Средином деведесетих година прошлог века Кина је први пут кодификовала сопствену безбедносну политику, усвајањем прве Беле књиге одбране током 1995. године. 12 Кинески "нови безбедносни концепт", како га је окарактерисала Кери Дамбох, требало је да увери остале државе да економски и војни раст не представљају претњу по међународну безбедност (Dumbaugh, 2008, р. 5).…”

“…Други изазов "новој улози" КПК представља такозвана "унутрашња варијабла", односно унутрашње (не)стабилности друштвеног, политичког и економског поретка у Кини. Све више је аутора који заступају став да унутрашњи политичко-економски процеси битно диктирају улогу КПК у формулисању кохерентне спољнополитичке агенде (Blackwill, Tellis, 2015;Falon, 2015;Hwang, 2021). На језгровиту Велику стратегију ће у наредних пар деценија битно утицати материјални диспаритет на системском нивоу, развој система међународних односа који фаворизује повратак крутог "вестфалског поретка", затим активности могућег изазивача глобалног вођства НР Кине, али и непредвиђени феномени чије се последице очитују у коренитим променама система попут такозваних "црних лабудова" (Đorđević, Stekić, 2022).…”

The rise of China between Global IR and area studies: an agenda for cooperation

“…The essentialization of the Confucian identity is particularly significant in the writings of the Chinese School that tends to portray the PRC as inherently pacifist, reformist, and inclusive, as opposed to a West willing to impose its own interests and values, also through conflict (Zhang, 2013;Hwang, 2021). This process tends to further strengthen the tendency to speak for power, reproducing the same dynamic that many critical and post-colonial theorists denounce in mainstream theories of IR, from the contemporary liberalism to the hegemonic stability theory.…”

“…Therefore, theories such as the hegemonic stability theory (or its liberal variants, à la Ikenberry), for instance, would be considered as a form of legitimation for the US hegemony (Seth, 2009). Moreover, critical theory aims at denouncing the ‘technical reason’ dominant in mainstream IR (Neufeld, 1995) and its conservative bias, trying to avoid, in the words of Kimberly Hutchins, ‘reproduce the patterns of hegemonic power of the present’ (Hutchings, 2021).…”

“…Overall, it can be argued that the Chinese School tends to essentialize identities, historical legacies, and cultural traits, to explain foreign policy behaviours or specific orientations in international affairs. This approach offers a substantially essentialist reading of Chinese foreign policy, stressing the causal effect of the Chinese Confucian culture (Hwang, 2021). Another, and maybe even more fundamental, problem is the risk of 'talking for power'.…”