Rearticulating Realism: Chains of Reference and Epistemic Success in the Sciences

Abstract

In recent decades, the long-standing debate about the scientific status of the social sciences and their explanatory nature has been rearticulated through perspectivist, interpretivist, and mechanistic approaches. Whereas mechanistic approaches advocate for realism in sociological models, perspectivist and interpretivist perspectives challenge this by emphasizing the multiple interpretations and meaningful nature of social reality, as opposed to the natural sciences. Currently, the metatheoretical discussion centers on competing views regarding the relationship between theories and the objects they address. In contrast to this focus on theories, I propose a rearticulation of Hacking’s interventionist argument. I argue that all sciences share a common epistemic activity—the construction of chains of reference—which points to shared notions of success. This paves the way for realism through a practice-based argument that does not originate from ontological disputes, suggesting that our best theories are those literally embedded in scientific practice.