Reason, Right, and Revolution: Kant and Locke

Flikschuh, Katrin

doi:10.1111/j.1088-4963.2008.00146.x

Cited by 43 publications

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“…35 See Buchanan 2013 for an interesting discussion of the risks associated with consent being the product of coercion or manipulation in this context. 36 The view defended here is of course premised on the rejection of Kant's idea that the only body capable of acting on behalf of a political community is its government (Flikschuh 2008;Korsgaard 2008, 254;Ripstein, 336;see also, Smith 2008). Insightful discussions of how the notion of authorization operates in this context are Finlay 2010;Lazar 2016;Benbaji 2018.…”

Section: The Symmetry View Revisitedmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Revolution and Intervention

Renzo

2019

Nous

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Provided that traditional jus ad bellum principles are fulfilled, military humanitarian intervention to stop large scale violations of human rights (such as genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes) is widely regarded as morally permissible. In cases of “supreme humanitarian emergency”, not only are the victims morally permitted to rebel, but other states are also permitted to militarily intervene. Things are different if the human rights violations in question fall short of supreme humanitarian emergency. Because of the importance of respecting political self‐determination, in cases of “ordinary oppression”, we normally think that rebellion might be permissible, but not military humanitarian intervention. Thus, according to the received view, the conditions for the permissibility of intervention coincide with the conditions for the permissibility of revolution in cases of supreme humanitarian emergency, but not in cases of ordinary oppression. In cases of ordinary oppression there is an asymmetry between the conditions for the permissibility of revolution and intervention (call this the Asymmetry View). Should we accept the Asymmetry View? I answer this question by outlining an account of political self‐determination and by illustrating the complex role that this notion should play in discussing the morality of revolution and intervention.

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Section: The Symmetry View Revisitedmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The view defended here is of course premised on the rejection of Kant's idea that the only body capable of acting on behalf of a political community is its government (Flikschuh ; Korsgaard , 254; Ripstein, 336; see also, Smith ). Insightful discussions of how the notion of authorization operates in this context are Finlay ; Lazar ; Benbaji .…”

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Revolution and Intervention

Renzo

2019

Nous

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“…After all, the harm principle is a critical and normative principle to be used to judge decisions about criminalization, not to confirm our intuitions about what should and 56 Compare Kant (1996, pp. 14, 20-21, 147-149); for recent restatements of Kant's project of legal philosophy along these lines, see Ripstein (2004) and Flikschuh (2008). 57 Even in the Kantian legal context, there are cases where consent would be irrelevant to criminal liability, and these cases do raise difficult issues for the criminal law of a liberal democratic state (e.g., R. v. Brown (1993)).…”

Section: The Trouble With the Harm Principle: An Examplementioning

confidence: 99%

The Limits of the Harm Principle

Stewart

2009

Criminal Law, Philosophy

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The harm principle, understood as the normative requirement that conduct should be criminalized only if it is harmful, has difficulty in dealing with those core cases of criminal wrongdoing that can occur without causing any direct harm. Advocates of the harm principle typically find it implausible to hold that these core cases should not be crimes and so usually seek out some indirect harm that can justify criminalizing the seemingly harmless conduct. But this strategy justifies criminalization of a wide range of conduct on the basis of the fear, worry, and anxiety it generates among those who are not the direct victims of the conduct, and thereby undermines the limiting role of the harm principle by permitting the very move it was meant to prevent: the criminalization of harmless conduct on the ground of others' feelings about it. The best way to avoid this dilemma is to recognize that people have rights, operating independently of the harm principle, to be treated in certain ways just because they are persons. The existence of such rights provides a ground for both criminalizing conduct and limiting the scope of criminalization because these rights point both to conduct that people must be permitted to engage in (regardless of its harmful effects) and conduct that might well be criminalized (though it is not harmful). A complete account of criminal law will therefore require the harm principle to work together with an independent account of rights.

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“…34 34 See Kant (1996b), p. 8:304. Flikschuh’s (2008a) low bar is apparent in her position that even a governing authority that denies its people this right could retain legitimacy if it is “the sole possible representative of the idea of the general will,” p. 395. …”

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“…35 35 Flikschuh (2008a) also recognizes the possibility of the violent dissolution of the state, which she says may occur if and when repression becomes “literally unbearable,” p. 396. But she treats this possibility, in a broadly Hegelian or Marxist way, only as a natural caused event, not one subject to moral evaluation.…”

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Kant’s Political Philosophy

Ebels-Duggan¹

2012

Philosophy Compass

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Kant’s political theory stands in the social contract tradition, but departs significantly from earlier versions of social contract theory. Most importantly Kant holds, against Hobbes and Locke, that we have not merely a pragmatic reason but an obligation to exit the state of nature and found a state. Kant holds that each person has an innate right to freedom, but it is possible to simultaneously honor everyone’s right only under the rule of law. Since we are obligated to respect each person’s right to freedom, and can do so only in a state, we are obligated to submit to the authority of the state if we have one, and to establish one if we do not. In the first half of the essay I reconstruct this argument in more detail. In the second half I survey four points of controversy: (i) What is the relationship between Kant’s political philosophy and his moral philosophy? (ii) How does the innate right to freedom support the postulate that we are permitted to acquire property and other private rights? (iii) How does the postulate support an obligation to found the state? (iv) How should we understand Kant’s views about political revolutions?

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Reason, Right, and Revolution: Kant and Locke

Cited by 43 publications

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Revolution and Intervention

Revolution and Intervention

The Limits of the Harm Principle

Kant’s Political Philosophy

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