Reason unbound: Kant's theory of regulative principles

Abstract

It is an essential part of Kant's conception of regulative principles and ideas that those principles and ideas are in a certain sense indeterminate. The relevant sense of indeterminacy is cashed out in a section in the Antinomies where Kant says that the regress of conditions of experience forms not a “regressus in infinitum” but a “regressus in indefinitum.” The mathematics that Kant appears to rely on in making this distinction turns out to be problematic, as Jonathan Bennett showed long ago. But I suggest that despite this, there is another mathematically legitimate way to make Kant's point, one enunciated by, among others, Michael Dummett. This reading is corroborated, I suggest, by Kant's conception of reason as a radically open‐ended endeavor.

A rule‐based account of the regulative use of reason in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason

“…The challenge for the reading I am proposing is therefore not so much to find textual evidence for it (which is abundant) but to show that Kant develops a coherent story. Taking my cue from other contributions that have emphasized the prescriptive role of reason (Kraus, 2020; Massimi, 2017; Walden, 2019), I will present a unified account that will hopefully explain why the regulative use of reason is legitimate and thereby can have a positive use in science 19…”

“…The challenge for the reading I am proposing is therefore not so much to find textual evidence for it (which is abundant) but to show that Kant develops a coherent story. Taking my cue from other contributions that have emphasized the prescriptive role of reason (Kraus, 2020;Massimi, 2017;Walden, 2019), I will present a unified account that will hopefully explain why the regulative use of reason is legitimate and thereby can have a positive use in science. 19 More specifically, I submit that not enough attention has been given so far to a crucial aspect of the prescriptive role of reason: the fact that reason's prescriptions are not to be applied to things in themselves or appearances but to the empirical use of the understanding.…”

“…A detailed analysis of this problem goes beyond the scope of this work.7 See, for example,Grier (2001, p. 116).8Grier (2001) andAllison (2004). See alsoBoehm (2012) andWalden (2019).9 For a critical view, see, for example,McLaughlin (2014).10 Passages quoted inGrier (2001, pp. 119-125).…”

“…19 19 The “I‐Rule” interpretation of ideas presented in Massimi (2017) is a fascinating alternative to traditional accounts of transcendental illusion. Walden (2019) provides an interesting explanation of why the regulative use of reason is metaphysically innocent. However, they both rely on a positive reading of transcendental illusion.…”

“…That the regulative use of reason is here called an "illusion" may be due to the fact that ideas act as "vanishing points" for the understanding. Kant seems, therefore, to be using "illusion" as a synonym for other expressions that appear in the Appendix, such as "projection" or "asymptote" (A647/B675; A663/B691).19 The "I-Rule" interpretation of ideas presented inMassimi (2017) is a fascinating alternative to traditional accounts of transcendental illusion Walden (2019). provides an interesting explanation of why the regulative use of reason is metaphysically innocent.…”