Reasons and Moral Principles

Väyrynen, Pekka

doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.013.37

Cited by 16 publications

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References 42 publications

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“…See, among other places, Bales ; Smith ; McKeever and Ridge , §1.2; and Väyrynen , §3. Of course, in some cases one and the same principle might function as both a standard and a guide.…”

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The Explanatory Ambitions of Moral Principles

Berker

2018

Nous

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Moral properties are explained by other properties. And moral principles tell us about moral properties. How are these two ideas related? In particular, is the truth of a given moral principle part of what explains why a given action has a given moral property? I argue “No.” If moral principles are merely concerned with the extension of moral properties across all possible worlds, then they cannot be partial explainers of facts about the instantiation of those properties, since in general necessitation does not suffice for explanation. And if moral principles are themselves about what explains the moral properties under their purview, then by their own lights they are not needed in order to explain those moral properties’ instantiation—unless, that is, the principles exhibit an objectionable form of metaphysical circularity. So moral principles cannot explain why individual actions have moral properties. Nor, I also argue, can they explain why certain other factors explain why those actions have the moral properties that they do, or in some other way govern or mediate such first‐order explanations of particular moral facts. When it comes to the explanation of an individual action's specific moral features, moral principles are explanatorily idle.

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The Explanatory Ambitions of Moral Principles

Berker

2018

Nous

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Brute Balancing, Proportionality and Meta-Weighing of Reasons

Sampaio

2021

Proportionality, Balancing, and Rights

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The Normative and the Evaluative

Rowland¹

2019

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Many have been attracted to the idea that for something to be good is just for there to be reasons to favour it. This view has come to be known as the buck-passing account of value. According to the buck-passing account, for pleasure to be good is just for there to be reasons for us to desire and pursue it. And for liberty and equality to be values is just for there to be reasons for us to promote and preserve them. There has been extensive discussion of some of the problems that the buck-passing account faces such as the wrong kind of reason problem. But there has been little discussion of why we should accept the buck-passing account or what the theoretical pay-offs and other implications of accepting it are. This book provides the first comprehensive motivation and defence of the buck-passing account of value. It argues that the buck-passing account explains several important features of the relationship between reasons and value, as well as the relationship between the different varieties of value, in a way that its competitors do not. It argues that alternatives to the buck-passing account are inconsistent with important views in normative ethics, are uninformative, and are at odds with the way in which we should see practical and epistemic normativity as related. And it extends the buck-passing account to provide an account of moral properties as well as all other normative and deontic properties, such as fittingness and ought, in terms of reasons.

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Reasons and Moral Principles

Cited by 16 publications

References 42 publications

The Explanatory Ambitions of Moral Principles

The Explanatory Ambitions of Moral Principles

Brute Balancing, Proportionality and Meta-Weighing of Reasons

The Normative and the Evaluative

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