Abstract:What kind of thing is a reason for action? What is it to act for a reason?And what is the connection between acting for a reason and rationality? There is controversy about the many issues raised by these questions. In this paper I shall answer the first question with a conception of practical reasons that I call 'Factualism', which says that all reasons are facts. I defend this conception against its main rival, Psychologism, which says that practical reasons are mental states or mental facts, and also agains… Show more
“…Maria Alvarez (, ) has offered a defense of factualism against such arguments from factual error. Alvarez argues that if the agent's putative reason for Ф‐ing was really no good reason at all, it is perfectly natural to say the agent Ф‐ed for no reason at all: … it is not always clear that the right way of characterizing the kind of case just described is in terms of ‘no good reason’, as opposed to merely ‘no reason’.…”
Section: What Motivating Reasons Cannot Bementioning
confidence: 99%
“…I won't discuss this possibility here, but it does not strike me as an independently plausible view about normative reasons. 15 For examples of factualism about motivating reasons, see Alvarez (2010Alvarez ( , 2016 and Bittner (2001). fails to count in favor of Ф-ing, or (2) by failing to be a fact at all (even if it's the case that if it were a fact, it would count in favor of Ф-ing). Let's call the first 'normative error' and the second 'factual error.…”
Section: Factualismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is simply implausible to claim, as the factualist does, that Jenny believes for no reason at all. Maria Alvarez (2010Alvarez ( , 2016 has offered a defense of factualism against such arguments from factual error. Alvarez argues that if the agent's putative reason for Ф-ing was really no good reason at all, it is perfectly natural to say the agent Ф-ed for no reason at all:…”
In this paper, I defend an account of the reasons for which we act, believe, and so on for any Ф such that there can be reasons for which we Ф. Such reasons are standardly called motivating reasons. I argue that three dominant views of motivating reasons (psychologism, factualism and disjunctivism) all fail to capture the ordinary concept of a motivating reason. I show this by drawing out three constraints on what motivating reasons must be, and demonstrating how each view fails to satisfy at least one of these constraints. I then propose and defend my own account of motivating reasons, which I call the Guise of Normative Reasons Account. On the account I defend, motivating reasons are propositions. A proposition is the reason for which someone Ф‐s when (a) she represents that proposition as a normative reason to Ф, and (b) her representation explains, in the right way, her Ф‐ing. As I argue, the Guise of Normative Reasons Account satisfies all three constraints on what motivating reasons must be, and weathers several objections that might be leveled against propositionalist views.
“…Maria Alvarez (, ) has offered a defense of factualism against such arguments from factual error. Alvarez argues that if the agent's putative reason for Ф‐ing was really no good reason at all, it is perfectly natural to say the agent Ф‐ed for no reason at all: … it is not always clear that the right way of characterizing the kind of case just described is in terms of ‘no good reason’, as opposed to merely ‘no reason’.…”
Section: What Motivating Reasons Cannot Bementioning
confidence: 99%
“…I won't discuss this possibility here, but it does not strike me as an independently plausible view about normative reasons. 15 For examples of factualism about motivating reasons, see Alvarez (2010Alvarez ( , 2016 and Bittner (2001). fails to count in favor of Ф-ing, or (2) by failing to be a fact at all (even if it's the case that if it were a fact, it would count in favor of Ф-ing). Let's call the first 'normative error' and the second 'factual error.…”
Section: Factualismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is simply implausible to claim, as the factualist does, that Jenny believes for no reason at all. Maria Alvarez (2010Alvarez ( , 2016 has offered a defense of factualism against such arguments from factual error. Alvarez argues that if the agent's putative reason for Ф-ing was really no good reason at all, it is perfectly natural to say the agent Ф-ed for no reason at all:…”
In this paper, I defend an account of the reasons for which we act, believe, and so on for any Ф such that there can be reasons for which we Ф. Such reasons are standardly called motivating reasons. I argue that three dominant views of motivating reasons (psychologism, factualism and disjunctivism) all fail to capture the ordinary concept of a motivating reason. I show this by drawing out three constraints on what motivating reasons must be, and demonstrating how each view fails to satisfy at least one of these constraints. I then propose and defend my own account of motivating reasons, which I call the Guise of Normative Reasons Account. On the account I defend, motivating reasons are propositions. A proposition is the reason for which someone Ф‐s when (a) she represents that proposition as a normative reason to Ф, and (b) her representation explains, in the right way, her Ф‐ing. As I argue, the Guise of Normative Reasons Account satisfies all three constraints on what motivating reasons must be, and weathers several objections that might be leveled against propositionalist views.
“…(See, for example, the papers collected in Nute .) A reason is “a consideration that counts in favor” of something (Scanlon , following Raz ); a pro tanto reason is one that can be defeated (Kagan , 47; Alvarez , 12). If we interpret counting in favor as functioning as a premise in practical reasoning, and treat that reasoning as defeasible or nonmonotonic, we get a picture of reasons as practical defaults.…”
Section: Practical Defeasibilitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…If we interpret counting in favor as functioning as a premise in practical reasoning, and treat that reasoning as defeasible or nonmonotonic, we get a picture of reasons as practical defaults. There are thus two theses underlying such theories: As Kieran Setiya puts the first, “A reason for action is a premise of practical reasoning” (2014, 221) or, setting questions about the metaphysical nature of reasons aside (see, e.g., Alvarez , , Hyman ), is at least specified by a premise of practical reasoning. Reasons (or reason‐statements) function as practical premises.Practical reasoning is typically defeasible or nonmonotonic, an instance of common‐sense reasoning in which the addition of a premise can lead us to retract a conclusion.…”
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