Reassessing marketing boards as hybrid arrangements: evidence from Canadian experiences

Abstract

In this article, we reassess the role of marketing boards and similar arrangements that have played an important role in numerous agro-food sectors of developed countries over almost a century. Referring to transaction cost economics and to more recent contributions on the allocation of decision and property rights, we interpret these arrangements as hybrid modes of governance. We hypothesize that uncertainty is the leading force pushing toward these organizational solutions and we explore forms of uncertainty at stake and their impact in shaping various types of hybrids. We also explore the role of institutional embeddedness in providing marketing boards and the like their legitimacy. Using numerous examples from Canadian marketing boards, we discuss the benefits and point out flaws of these arrangements. We conclude on the need to assess comparatively the role of these solutions with respect to, for example, a system of bilateral contracts.JEL classifications: D02, D23, L38, Q10, Q13

Public Private Partnerships in food industries: A road to success?

“…As suggested by Menard's framework, these collaborations can thus be seen as an adaptive strategy from both public and private agents to a non-manageable exogenous shock rather than the result of a regulatory change. Royer et al (2016) apply this framework to the agri-food industry in order to explain the resilience of marketing boards in Canada, interprofessions in France and marketing orders in the United States. They provide insights on how these arrangements can outperform 'command and control' regulation and pure market mechanisms.…”

“…They provide insights on how these arrangements can outperform 'command and control' regulation and pure market mechanisms. Royer et al (2016) argue that their organizational and institutional properties, as meso-institutions, translate into incentive mechanisms that solve coordination problems. Indeed, food products require a tight coordination because of the interdependence of actors and their perishable nature.…”

“…Indeed, food products require a tight coordination because of the interdependence of actors and their perishable nature. Royer et al (2016) provide the main characteristics of these arrangements: they must be collective, and thus provide incentive mechanisms to avoid free riding, so as to reduce transactional uncertainty.…”

“…As suggested by Royer et al (2016) these uncertainties lead to the need of a tight coordination through industry-wide actions.…”

“…Moreover, Royer et al (2016) argue that these collective arrangements must provide mechanisms to avoid free riding and reduce uncertainties surrounding transactions such as in contractual PPPs. We thus focus on such incentives mechanism that can help lower transaction costs (see Table 1).…”