Reassessing Mass Support for Political and Economic Change in the Former USSR

Abstract

Using survey data collected in Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuanian in 1990–92, we reexamine findings reported by Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992). Our analysis indicates a significant link between political and economic reform orientations. Individuals who prefer political reforms of a democratic nature also favor a decreased role of the state in guaranteeing social well-being. In addition, our finding that better-educated Soviet and post-Soviet citizens are more likely than the less-well-educated to prefer individual responsibility for well-being is in direct contradiction to the findings reported by Finifter and Mickiewicz. The differences in the two sets of conclusions give rise to very different substantive conclusions regarding the economic and political changes now occurring in these societies.

Democracy, Market Liberalization, and Political Preferences

“…Pushing the argument one step further, some authors have argued that the desire for political freedom and democratic institutions does not arise until countries reach a certain degree of material comfort and market liberalization (Lipset, 1959;Miller et al, 1994Miller et al, , 1996. Hence, the argument goes, not only is it preferable to postpone democracy until advanced stages of a country's economic development, but this sequence also meets citizens' preferences.…”

Social Legitimation of Capitalism in Ukraine: from Socio-cultural Path-dependence to Rationalization of Economic Situation

“…A series of investigations in the beginning of transformation in post-socialist countries has demonstrated that the support for democracy makes a very important contribution to the support for free-market reform (Duch, 1993;Miller, Hesli, Reisinger, 1994;Gibson, 1996). But in the further course of transit with a prevalence of traditional thinking of people the democracy became a symbol of total impoverishment and unsuccessful economic reforms.…”

Russian Public Opinion on Human Rights and the War in Chechnya

“…Studies of public attitudes toward democracy in Russia often report that younger, more urbanized, male, better educated, and better off Russians are more inclined to support democratic norms (Finifter and Mickiewicz, 1990;Hahn, 1991;Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger, 1994;Brym, 1996;Miller, Reisinger, and Hesli, 1996;Bahry, Boaz, and Gordon, 1997;Kulberg and Zimmerman, 1999). If this applies to support for human rights norms, then even if overall support for a particular dimension is weak, there are grounds for optimism because those groups who are more politically active and influential are the strongest supporters.…”