Rebel and Incumbent Law and the Durability of Post-Civil War Peace

Abstract

Long-term peace after a civil war is difficult to maintain. Conventional wisdom emphasizes the distribution of goods through a comprehensive peace agreement. However, civil wars with a settlement recur faster than those without. To better understand civil war recurrence, I argue for greater emphasis on another step in the peace-making process: future conflict resolution. When a civil war ends, actors are less likely to return to fighting when they perceive a governing legal system as sufficiently legitimate to resolve their post-civil war conflict. This perception of legitimacy is partly a function of the degree of alignment of the actors' legal principles –– the formalization and aggregation of values, beliefs, and expectations for how society should be structured and disputes or conflicts resolved. Therefore, settlements should be more likely to succeed as the warring parties' legal principles gain alignment. I create the first cross-national dyadic dataset of rebel and incumbent laws from 1989-2006 to examine this argument and find systematic support. A discussion on the post-civil war Abyei and Br\u cko conflicts further highlight the argument. This study has substantial theoretical and policy implications for post-civil war peace, rebel governance, and state-building.