Rebel Governance at the Time of Covid-19: Emergencies as Opportunities for Rebel Rulers

Abstract

As Covid-19 has spread worldwide, not only governments but also rebel rulers have had to face the crisis. Therefore, it is important to understand whether exogenous shocks pose to rebel rulers the same challenges they pose to governments. To answer this question, I will refer to the academic literature and I will study two insurgent groups that have been confronted by coronavirus-Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the Taliban. Following the case studies, I will argue that while emergencies pose great challenges to governments, they provide rebel rulers with an opportunity to project themselves as more credible and legitimate rulers.

Did Covid‐19 Change Armed Group Governance? Evidence from a Survey of Local Security Authorities in Colombia

“…While many scholars of organised crime and rebel governance anticipated that armed groups would capitalise on the pandemic to expand their control or demonstrate their capacity to improve upon governance by the state (e.g. Furlan, 2020), we find little support for this claim in our survey of local security officials in Colombia. These findings are particularly striking given widespread expectations that Colombia was particularly ripe for the expansion of armed group power during the pandemic.…”

“…During the first months of the Covid‐19 pandemic, scholars and media outlets raised concerns that armed groups would take advantage of the disruptions it caused to expand their control of territory and civilian life (e.g. Angelo, 2020; Barnes and Albarracín, 2020; Idler and Hochmuller, 2020; Furlan, 2020). Emergencies are thought to create power vacuums that provide armed groups with the opportunity to demonstrate their credibility and legitimacy in comparison to the state (Furlan, 2020; Koehnlein and Koren, 2021).…”

“…Angelo, 2020; Barnes and Albarracín, 2020; Idler and Hochmuller, 2020; Furlan, 2020). Emergencies are thought to create power vacuums that provide armed groups with the opportunity to demonstrate their credibility and legitimacy in comparison to the state (Furlan, 2020; Koehnlein and Koren, 2021). In Rio de Janeiro's favelas, for instance, drug traffickers enforced quarantines and distributed soap and hand sanitiser (Berg and Visori, 2020; Brancoli, 2020).…”

Movement under state and non-state authorities during COVID-19: Evidence from Lebanon

“…Non-state armed groups, such as Ha'ayt Tahrir al-Sham in Syria, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, and Hamas in the Gaza Strip, rule over an estimated 60–80 million civilians worldwide, and emerged as part of the global response to COVID-19. As a result, some researchers have also examined how non-state armed groups (henceforth, armed groups), have addressed the COVID-19 pandemic in areas under their influence ( Furlan, 2020 , Swed, 2021 ). Armed groups have responded with a wide range of policies, for instance, promoting preventive measures, developing infrastructure to address the pandemic, and placing movement restrictions ( Breslawski, 2022 ).…”

New Directions in Rebel Governance Research

“…In Nepal, judges travelled to rural villages as a “mobile team” to consult with victims prior to trial in cases of domestic violence against women (Braithwaite 2015, 12). In mid-March 2020, a public health campaign in north-western Syria aimed to prevent the spread of COVID-19 (Furlan 2020). In none of these cases were these programs and services provided by the state.…”