Rebels Leading London: the mayoralties of Ken Livingstone and Boris Johnson compared

Abstract

This article compares the mayoralties of the first two directly elected Mayors of London, KenLivingstone and Boris Johnson. The position offers a commanding electoral platform, but weak powers to lead a city regarded as 'ungovernable' (Travers 2004).The two mayors had some obvious points of comparison: both were party rebels, mavericks and skilled media operators. Both also used publicity to make up for weak powers, but courted controversy and faced charges of corruption and cronyism.Utilising Hambleton and Sweeting (2004), this article compares their mayoralties in terms of vision, leadership style and policies. Livingstone had a powerful vision that translated into clear policy aims while Johnson was more cautious, shaped by a desire for higher office. In terms of style, Livingstone built coalitions but proved divisive whereas Johnson retained remarkable levels of popularity. Where Livingstone bought experience and skill, Johnson delegated. In policy terms, the two mayors found themselves pushed by their institutional powers towards transport and planning while struggling with deeper issues such as housing. Livingstone introduced the radical congestion charge and a series of symbolic policies. Johnson was far more modest -championing cycling, the 2012 Olympics and avoiding difficult decisions. The two used their office to negotiate, but also challenge, central government. Livingstone's rebel mayoralty was a platform for personalised change, Johnson's one for personal ambition.

London’s food policy: Leveraging the policy sub-system, programme and plan

“…An elected Mayor and Assembly would 'consult widely and work closely with London organisations -boroughs, the private sector and voluntary bodies -in a new inclusive style of politics' (Pilgrim 2006 p226). This was designed to 'provide London-wide government, without handing too much power to a single figure who could use it as a platform against central government' (Worthy et al 2019). The hope was to avoid conflict by emphasising that 'the London boroughs and the City were with some exceptions to remain responsible for the delivery of local services' while 'expected to work closely with the Mayor and Assembly to ensure that there was good information to inform strategic decisions and to assist in the delivery of 'agreed London-wide policies'' and 'restricting the activities of the core GLA bureaucracy to setting strategies, making sure that arm's length bodies (the London Development Agency, the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority, the Metropolitan Police Authority and Transport for London) ran those London-wide services which had passed to the GLA' (Pilgrim 2006 p227).…”

“…The remainder are institutional in nature, relating to the tenor of relationships between actors and the prevailing organisational culture of the GLA' (Rydin et al 2003 p59). Even the budgetary powers are 'far less than their Parisian or New York counterparts, being 'squashed' between jealouslyguarded central government funding and borough budgets' (Travers 2004, in Worthy et al 2019. Along with the resources available, the Mayor also influences policymaking through their own personal agenda and a manifesto, over a relatively short-term electoral cycle (Rydin et al 2013).…”

“…Their 'soft power' advocacy has also been influential, for instance in encouraging take up of the London Living Wage' (Blick & Dunleavy 2017 p4). Both Mayor's Livingstone and Johnson used publicity to make up for weak powers (Worthy et al 2019).…”

“…It results in a programme of activities around food where hard policy measures such as banning advertising to address one issue (obesity), sit alongside softer tactics such as 'chucking cabbages' publicity (urban agriculture) and league tables (food poverty) for others. Limitations on the scope of London to challenge national policymaking powers in Westminster, built into design of the GLA and its Mayor (Worthy et al 2019), are also relevant, raising the question of what reimagining of powers will be needed in cities to deal with modern realities like obesity and food poverty, where primary levers may be held by national government.…”

Dramaturgy and crisis management: A third act

“…This is perhaps best expressed by one of his biographers who describes this in terms of the cultivation of a kind of “intelligent helplessness” that generates positive sentiment (Purcell 2012, p. 146). However, a consistent theme in the testimony of those closest to him is also that there is a private persona to complement the “act” of intelligent helplessness and that this belies a more ruthless, determined and highly individualized politician (Purcell, 2012; Worthy et al, 2019). The traits that connect the public and the private, however, are an eagerness to please audiences, an unwillingness to confront bad news, an excessive optimism and an eschewing of detail and rigor in working practices (Tomkins, 2020).…”