Rebels, Revenue and Redistribution: The Political Geography of Post-Conflict Power-Sharing in Africa

Abstract

Do rebel elites who gain access to political power through power-sharing reward their own ethnic constituencies after war? The authors argue that power-sharing governments serve as instruments for rebel elites to access state resources. This access allows elites to allocate state resources disproportionately to their regional power bases, particularly the settlement areas of rebel groups' ethnic constituencies. To test this proposition, the authors link information on rebel groups in power-sharing governments in post-conflict countries in Africa to information about ethnic support for rebel organizations. They combine this information with sub-national data on ethnic groups' settlement areas and data on night light emissions to proxy for sub-national variation in resource investments. Implementing a difference-in-differences empirical strategy, the authors show that regions with ethnic groups represented through rebels in the power-sharing government exhibit higher levels of night light emissions than regions without such representation. These findings help to reconceptualize post-conflict power-sharing arrangements as rent-generating and redistributive institutions.

Colonial Education, Political Elites, and Regional Political Inequality in Africa

“…Cabinet ministers are important to understand political representation, the distribution of resources, and conflict, especially in semi-and non-democratic countries where legislatures and other formal institutions are often weak. Kramon and Posner (2016, p. 1) present evidence that "ministerial appointments [in Kenya] come with real power to impact distributive politics," Andre et al (2018) present similar findings for Benin, and Franck and Rainer (2012) and Haass and Ottmann (2020) present similar findings across Africa. 4 Hodler and Raschky (2014, p. 995) show that the birth region of the current leader develops more than the rest, especially in developing countries.…”

The Effect of Wartime Legacies on Electoral Mobilization after Civil War

“…When rebels strike a peace deal with a government, they often gain access to political and economic resources in return (Haass and Ottmann 2017). These resources can come in the form of shared ownership of parastatals in resource-driven conflicts, as lucrative ministry positions in post-conflict governments, or in the form of enormous reconstruction or disarmament aid programs, which often directly target rebels (Haass and Ottmann 2021;Tajima 2016;Zürcher et al 2013). These peace dividends equip rebels with resources that they can allocate for political reasons (Kramon and Posner 2013).…”

“…In these instances, rebels' bargaining power at the negotiation table often allows military networks to survive even extensive demobilization (Themnér 2017). Moreover, power-sharing arrangements that divide government ministries among belligerents-and thus access to spoils from government and international aid-enable former rebels to access and control at least parts of peace dividends for electoral purposes (Haass and Ottmann 2021;Ottmann 2020). These types of arrangements also typically stipulate elections as a key element of the post-conflict peace process.…”

Self‐Ruleand Intrastate Conflict Risk in Divided Societies: A Configurational Analysis of Consociational Institutions

“…When studying accommodative institutions, many authors follow Hartzell and Hoddie's conceptualization of power‐sharing, commonly understood as ‘those rules that (…) allocate decision‐making rights, including access to state resources, among collectivities competing for power” (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003: 320). In this context, self‐rule is usually designated as ‘territorial power sharing’ (Haass & Ottmann, 2020; Keil & McCulloch, 2021; Neudorfer et al, 2020). However, the conceptual relationship between power‐sharing and self‐rule is a non‐trivial issue.…”