Recasting payments for ecosystem services (PES) in water resource management: A novel institutional approach

Kolinjivadi, Vijay; Adamowski, Jan; Kosoy, Nicolás

doi:10.1016/j.ecoser.2014.08.008

Cited by 69 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 49 publications

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“…In this context, the negotiated and agreed opportunity cost of the RWA agreement becomes just one element of a much more complex and dynamic social reality. It is important to understand the social networks and linkages that reinforce the need for embedded social negotiation of PES-like contracts, as was done here, rather than the introduction of standardized templates developed elsewhere (Kolinjivadi et al 2014). Agreements must take into account historical costs and duties for the management of the same resource, or risk creating new conflicts that lead to resistance and dissent.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The politics of negotiation and implementation: a reciprocal water access agreement in the Himalayan foothills, India

Kovács¹,

Kumar²,

Agarwal³

et al. 2016

E&S

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ABSTRACT. In this paper, we examine the on-the-ground realities of upstream-downstream negotiations and transactions over ecosystem services. We explore the engagement, negotiation, implementation, and postimplementation phases of a "reciprocal water access" (RWA) agreement between village communities and municipal water users at Palampur, Himachal Pradesh, India. We aim to highlight how external actors drove the payments for ecosystem services agenda through a series of facilitation and research engagements, which were pivotal to the RWA's adoption, and how the agreement fared once external agents withdrew. In the postimplementation period, the RWA agreement continues to be upheld by upstream communities amidst evolving, competing land-use changes and claims. The introduction of cash payments for environmental services for forest-water relationships has given rise to multifaceted difficulties for the upstream hamlets, which has impeded the functionality of their forest management committee. Upstream communities' formal rights and abilities to control and manage their resources are dynamic and need strengthening and assurance; these developments result in fluctuating transaction and opportunity costs not originally envisaged by the RWA agreement. The paper demonstrates the importance of an explicit understanding of the local politics of negotiation and implementation to determine the effectiveness of compensationbased mechanisms for the supply of ecosystem services.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The politics of negotiation and implementation: a reciprocal water access agreement in the Himalayan foothills, India

Kovács¹,

Kumar²,

Agarwal³

et al. 2016

E&S

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“…Accurate and reliable UWD forecasting is necessary to help transition to more effective and sustainable urban water resources planning and management [BUTLER, ADAMOWSKI 2015;HALBE et al 2013;INAM et al 2015;KOLINJIVADI et al 2014;STRAITH et al 2014]. In this study, ELM W models based on their capacities of wavelet transformation and ELM modeling techniques were employed to simulate the UWD in the city of Calgary, Canada.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Water demand forecasting using extreme learning machines

Tiwari¹,

Adamowski²,

Adamowski³

2016

Journal of Water and Land Development

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The capacity of recently-developed extreme learning machine (ELM) modelling approaches in forecasting daily urban water demand from limited data, alone or in concert with wavelet analysis (W) or bootstrap (B) methods (i.e., ELM, ELM W , ELM B ), was assessed, and compared to that of equivalent traditional artificial neural network-based models (i.e., ANN, ANN W , ANN B ). The urban water demand forecasting models were developed using 3-year water demand and climate datasets for the city of Calgary, Alberta, Canada. While the hybrid ELM B and ANN B models provided satisfactory 1-day lead-time forecasts of similar accuracy, the ANN W and ELM W models provided greater accuracy, with the ELM W model outperforming the ANN W model. Significant improvement in peak urban water demand prediction was only achieved with the ELM W model. The superiority of the ELM W model over both the ANN W or ANN B models demonstrated the significant role of wavelet transformation in improving the overall performance of the urban water demand model.

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“…Ecosystem services (ES) have been defined in different ways, but most definitions focus on outcomes of ecosystem processes that directly influence human health and welfare, or that maintain the quantity and quality of various ecosystem goods (Daily ). Increasing attention has been focused in recent years on how payments for ecosystem services (PES) can be conceptualized, designed, implemented, and evaluated (Engel et al ; Wunschler et al ; Sommerville et al ; Daniels et al ; Farley and Costanza ; Kemkes et al ; Norgaard ; Lin ; Lin et al ; Kolinjivadi et al ). Goldman‐Benner et al () define PES as programs that “include voluntary transactions where well‐defined environmental (or ecosystem) services (or land uses likely to secure those services) are bought by a minimum of one service buyer, from a minimum of one service provider, if and only if the service provider continuously secures service provision (conditionality).” Other practices sometimes considered as desirable include additionality (the buyer of ES only pays the seller for actions/practices that would not otherwise take place) and the exclusion or limitation of side objectives (the program excludes or minimizes the pursuit of additional objectives) (Engel et al ; Goldman‐Benner et al ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Maximizing Returns from Payments for Water‐Based Ecosystem Services: Incorporating Externality Effects of Land Management

Eiswerth

Kooten²

2019

J American Water Resour Assoc

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Given the expansion of payments for water‐based ecosystem services (PWES) worldwide, two relevant issues are as follows: (1) determination of efficient allocations of payments among land managers, and (2) how this might change when paying one manager to implement a best management practice (BMP) to enhance an ecosystem service impacts the cost‐effectiveness of BMPs considered by other land managers not currently involved in PWES. Such externalities may be negative if diminishing returns dominate, or positive if mechanisms such as “social diffusion” dominate. We analyze how a planner should optimally allocate payments, depending on whether the expected externalities are negligible, negative, or positive. We employ (1) an optimal control model to gain insights on the problem’s dynamics, and (2) stochastic dynamic programming to determine optimal funding strategies using a specific application. The study contributes to the literature by identifying dynamically optimal PWES payment patterns, and illustrates how they should change when one accounts for externalities induced by the program. Because such impacts have not been addressed previously in a rigorous way, this treatment provides useful value added for PWES design and implementation.

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Recasting payments for ecosystem services (PES) in water resource management: A novel institutional approach

Cited by 69 publications

References 49 publications

The politics of negotiation and implementation: a reciprocal water access agreement in the Himalayan foothills, India

The politics of negotiation and implementation: a reciprocal water access agreement in the Himalayan foothills, India

Water demand forecasting using extreme learning machines

Maximizing Returns from Payments for Water‐Based Ecosystem Services: Incorporating Externality Effects of Land Management

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