Reciprocal climate negotiators

Nyborg, Karine

doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2017.08.008

Cited by 34 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 63 publications

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“…The reciprocity model of Rabin (1993) assumes that people derive utility from reciprocation of kindness and unkindness, in addition to the monetary gains. We base our analysis on the multi-player extension of this model by Nyborg (2017) and define the reciprocal utility as where i is the material payoff from the public good, i is the weight attributed to reciprocation, and R i is the reciprocation term. We use the same measure of kindness as in Nyborg (2017) and define the reciprocation term as:…”

Section: Reciprocity Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Voting on the threat of exclusion in a public goods experiment

2019

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Ostracism is practiced by virtually all societies around the world as a means of enforcing cooperation. In this paper, we use a public goods experiment to study whether groups choose to implement an institution that allows for the exclusion of members. We distinguish between a costless exclusion institution and a costly exclusion institution that, if chosen, reduces the endowment of all players. We also provide a comparison with an exclusion institution that is exogenously imposed upon groups. A significant share of the experimental groups choose the exclusion institution, even when it comes at a cost, and the support for the institution increases over time. Average contributions to the public good are significantly higher when the exclusion option is available, not only because low contributors are excluded but also because high contributors sustain a higher cooperation level under the exclusion institution. Subjects who vote in favor of the exclusion institution contribute more than those who vote against it, but only when the institution is implemented. These results are largely inconsistent with standard economic theory but can be better explained by assuming heterogeneous groups in which some players have selfish and others have social preferences.

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Section: Reciprocity Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Voting on the threat of exclusion in a public goods experiment

2019

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“…Reciprocal preferences (Rabin 1993, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004, Sobel 2005, Falk and Fischbacher 2006, Cox et al 2007 provides one plausible explanation for the prevalence of conditional cooperation. Reciprocity can be defined as the preference to repay kind intentions by kind actions and mean intentions by mean actions (Nyborg 2017). It can help explain why social sanctions and approval are often provided even in anonymous contexts, and at a net material cost to the sanctioner (Fehr andGächter 2002, Rabin 1993).…”

Section: Altruism Moral Norms Social Normsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In recent years, environmental and resource economists have increasingly turned their attention to informal institutions. A variety of informal mechanisms have been studied, such as social norms and social interaction, moral motivation, fairness norms, and reciprocal preferences (e.g., Czajkowski et al 2017;Nyborg 2017;Dasgupta et al 2016, Carlsson et al 2016Schlüter et al 2016;Richter and Grasman 2013;Dasgupta and Ehrlich 2013;Videras et al 2012;Allcott 2011;Cardenas 2011;Viscusi et al 2011;Brown and Hagen 2010;Asheim 2010;Johansson-Stenman and Konow 2010;Lange et al 2010;Kallbekken et al 2010;Brekke et al 2010;Bouma et al 2008;Halvorsen 2008;Nyborg et al 2006;Rege 2004;Brekke et al 2003. ) Topics that have been studied include, for example, ecolabeling, recycling, energy saving, common pool resource management and corporate social responsibility.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social Norms and the Environment

Nyborg

2018

Annu. Rev. Resour. Econ.

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Social norms affect environmental quality. But what exactly is a social norm? Environmental economists studying the topic draw on diverse scholarly traditions and may not have the same phenomenon in mind when using the concept. For example, social norms may refer to common, but not necessarily socially approved, behaviors; to internalized ethical rules; or to one of several equilibria in a coordination game. I first discuss some of the definitions used in the environmental economics literature. Then, I outline a simple framework for analysis of voluntary contributions to public goods. Using this framework, I illustrate differences and similarities between altruism, moral norms, and social norms and discuss implications for environmental policies. In particular, when a social norm represents one of several stable equilibria, policy can potentially invoke abrupt and dramatic behavioral changes.

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“…The policy implication is that if large emitters like the US and China adopt unilateral or bilateral measures to combat climate change, they should be encouraged since they may be triggering a move towards such a tipping point. As noted by Nyborg (2015), under the standard assumptions on preferences used in the IEA literature, which typically results in a prisoners' dilemma framework, it is not likely that the tipping point concept can be explained. However, when reciprocity is allowed for in the behavior of countries, Nyborg (2015) shows that the tipping point concept may be explained since non-signatory countries make an effort to reward the countries that have already signed the treaty.…”

Section: Behavioral Economics and Iea Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

International Environmental Agreements: Doomed to Fail or Destined to Succeed? A Review of the Literature

Marrouch

Chaudhuri

2016

IRERE

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We survey the economics literature on International Environmental Agreements (IEAs). We classify the extant literature into the following categories: pure IEA games without linkages, which focus on a single externality stemming from global pollution; IEA games with side payments and issue linkages, which consider carrot or stick mechanisms to lure cooperators or punish defectors; political economy models, which examine intra-and intergovernmental issues that affect international negotiations; design issues of IEAs; behavioral factors, which affect the willingness of countries to cooperate; and additional externalities resulting from open economy issues and adaptation, which interact with the global pollution externality and affect the free-riding incentives of countries. Based on this classification of the literature, we attempt to identify conditions under which an * We would like to thank Rita Antar for her excellent research assistance. We appreciate insightful comments by two anonymous reviewers and the editors.

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Reciprocal climate negotiators

Cited by 34 publications

References 63 publications

Voting on the threat of exclusion in a public goods experiment

Voting on the threat of exclusion in a public goods experiment

Social Norms and the Environment

International Environmental Agreements: Doomed to Fail or Destined to Succeed? A Review of the Literature

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