2013
DOI: 10.3390/g4030367
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Reciprocity Effects in the Trust Game

Abstract: I use data from a previous experiment for classifying subjects based on their behavior in the trust game. Prior literature defines a “reciprocity effect” as the tendency for Second Movers to return proportions increasing in the amounts that they receive. In the data that I use, 31% of Second Movers show reciprocity effects, 31% are neutral, and 25% consistently free-ride, indicating that the aggregate reciprocity effect for the sample as a whole is attributable to a minority of the subjects

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Cited by 3 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…The alteration in the variance was also accentuated. However, the difference in differences is statistically significant As the trustees' returns may be explained by aversion to iniquity or pure altruism (Engelmann & Strobel, 2010;Fehr & Schmidt, 2006;Rabin, 1993;Smith, 2013), it is necessary to make an inference about the presence of reciprocity motivated by other factors conditioned by the investor's behavior in the experiment. According to Coricelli et al (2006), if the trustee's return is simply motivated by pure altruism, then it should not depend on the investor's level of trust.…”
Section: Evaluation Of the Trust Gamementioning
confidence: 99%
“…The alteration in the variance was also accentuated. However, the difference in differences is statistically significant As the trustees' returns may be explained by aversion to iniquity or pure altruism (Engelmann & Strobel, 2010;Fehr & Schmidt, 2006;Rabin, 1993;Smith, 2013), it is necessary to make an inference about the presence of reciprocity motivated by other factors conditioned by the investor's behavior in the experiment. According to Coricelli et al (2006), if the trustee's return is simply motivated by pure altruism, then it should not depend on the investor's level of trust.…”
Section: Evaluation Of the Trust Gamementioning
confidence: 99%
“…46 This approach follows Fischbacher and Fehr (2001) and Smith (2013), who argue that a meaningful definition of reciprocal behavior is obtained when taking into account not only the spearman rho (ranging between -1 and +1), but also whether the correlation between amount returned by player and the amount has received (as presented by the 10 possible situations in the strategy method) is statistically significant. We obtain weaker empirical results when replacing our dichotomous variable with a correlation coefficient.…”
Section: Measuring Leadership Behaviormentioning
confidence: 99%