Reconceptualizing the Transitive Inference Ability: A Framework for Existing and Future Research

Wright, Barlow C.

doi:10.1006/drev.2000.0525

Cited by 35 publications

(72 citation statements)

References 58 publications

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“…Dual-Process theories may differ in terms of the exact nature of the two posited processing routes: Examples are System 1 v System 2, Associative v Rule-Based, Heuristic v Systematic, Heuristic v Analytic; and most recently Type 1 v Type 2, or Experiential v Analytic (e.g., see Chen & Chaiken, 1999;Evans, 2009;Klaczynski, 2009;Smith & Collins, 2009;Wright, 2001). …”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Regarding transitive reasoning, Kallio (1982) found that in order to succeed on his task within the Extensive-Training-Paradigm, children first demonstrated internalisation of the entire transitive series given by the pair-wise information, constructing an internal mental representation of the linearly graded scale (Breslow, 1981;Halford & Andrews, 2004;Wright, 2001). Note, Transitivity for Height v Speed 23 children generally tended to be able to generalise the series, only if the premises had been given in both directions and were fully-ordered (see also Riley & Trabasso, 1974;Stromer et al, 1993;Siegal, 2003;Wright, 2006b).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This was also relevant to the issue of whether different transitive tasks (here, height v racing) tend to lead to very different response profiles (e.g., see the location v length tasks of Russell et al, 1996). On this issue, some theorists argue that the different age estimates for acquisition of transitive reasoning may stem as much from the nature of the items and relations being reasoned about (i.e., the "content") as from the validity or ecological validity of the tasks used themselves (Bouwmeester & Sijtsma, 2006;Wright, 2001). 4, Finally, we wanted to use a paradigm offering specifically 4 year-olds every opportunity to show their transitive deductive capacity but which did not risk giving them "non-logical" cues to the correct answers (Riley & Trabasso, 1974;Wright & Dowker, 2002).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Transitivity for height versus speed: To what extent do the under-7s really have a transitive capacity?

Wright

Robertson

Hadfield

2011

Thinking & Reasoning

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Transitive inference underpins many human reasoning competencies. The dominant task (the "Extensive-Training-Paradigm") employs many items and large amounts of training, instilling an ordered series in the reasoner's mind. But findings from an alternative "3-Term-Paradigm" suggest transitivity is not present until 7+ years. Interestingly, a second alternative paradigm (the "Spatial-Task"), using simultaneously-displayed height relationships to form premise-pairs, can uphold the 4 year estimate. However, this paradigm risks cuing children and hence is problematic. We investigated whether a height-task variant might correspond to a more ecologically-valid 3-term task. 222 4-6 year-olds either completed a modified height task, including an increased familiarisation phase, or a computer-animated task about cartoon characters running a race in pairs. Findings confirmed both tasks were functionally identical.Crucially, 4 year-olds were at chance on both; whereas 6 year-olds performed competently. These findings contrast with estimates from all three paradigms considered. A theoretical evaluation of our tasks and procedures against previous ones, leads us to 2 conclusions. First, our estimate slightly amends the 7-year estimate offered by the 3-Term-Paradigm, with the difference explained in terms of its greater relevance to child experiences. Second, our estimate can coexist alongside the 4-year estimate from the Extensive-Training-Paradigm. This is because, applying a recently developed "Dual-Process" conception of reasoning, anticipates that extensive-training benefits a species-general Associative System, whilst the Spatial-Paradigm and 3-Term-Paradigm can potentially index a genuinely-Deductive System which has always been the target of transitive research. Deduction allows us to engage in quite complex problem-solving activities, but may sometimes form part of more routine unconscious or automatic thinking (Deneault & Ricard, 2006;Klaczynski, 2009;Muller, Sokol & Overton, 1999). Perhaps one of the most basic forms of deductive inference-making both in adults and in children is Transitive Reasoning (Bara, Bucciarelli & Lombardo, 2000;Halford, Wilson & Phillips, 1998;Lazareva & Wasserman, 2010). A child is said to possess transitive reasoning when he or she can deduce a latent relationship between two items (say A and C), after being given information about the relationship of each of these items to a third item (B) that just happens to be intermediate between the other two in some respect (Lee & Freire, 2003;Rabinowitz, Grant, Howe & Walsh, 1994).Our transitive reasoning capacity is said to be important for acquiring many cognitive concepts (see Krackhardt & Kilduff, 1999). It is also an integral part of children's educational progression, such that "in history class, one has to determine which event or personality preceded another; in geography, altitudes are represented by different colors; in geometry, measurement operations are performed;..." (Artman & Cahan, 1993, pp.753). Transitivity even features i...

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Transitivity for height versus speed: To what extent do the under-7s really have a transitive capacity?

Wright

Robertson

Hadfield

2011

Thinking & Reasoning

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“…Results of the third experiment also support the primary importance of social cueing because in another object-choice task, individuals preferred to choose the 'socially marked' container (touching, gaze alternation) to the remotely moved one when they had no visual information about the location of the toy. Keywords: cognition; decision by exclusion; deduction; dog; reasoning Despite the wide range of studies based on human and animal cognition published in the past decades, the evolutionary emergence of reasoning abilities including different types of logical reasoning in humans continues to be a puzzle for cognitive science (Wright 2001). The fundamental question is whether an observed problemsolving behaviour is a result of gradual development in performance due to learning processes or is a sudden solution emerging from mental reorganization of problem elements (i.e.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Despite the wide range of studies based on human and animal cognition published in the past decades, the evolutionary emergence of reasoning abilities including different types of logical reasoning in humans continues to be a puzzle for cognitive science (Wright 2001). The fundamental question is whether an observed problemsolving behaviour is a result of gradual development in performance due to learning processes or is a sudden solution emerging from mental reorganization of problem elements (i.e.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Dog-logic: inferential reasoning in a two-way choice task and its restricted use

et al. 2007

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Three experiments were designed to test whether adult pet dogs are able to show inferential reasoning when searching for their toy in a series of two-way choice tasks. The experimenter placed a toy under one of two identical containers and then provided some information by manipulating the covers: either both containers were lifted or just the empty or baited one. There were other trials when the experimenter not only revealed the corresponding container but manipulated also the other one without showing its content. In the second experiment the same conditions were used except that the content of the containers was revealed by strings without any human manipulation. Results of the two studies show that dogs are able to use inferential reasoning by exclusion (i.e. they can find the hidden toy if they have seen where the toy was missing). However, dogs were able to solve the reasoning task only when they could not rely on social-communicative cues (directional gesture and gaze cues) or could not use any other simple discriminative stimuli (movement of a container) for making decisions. This suggests that dogs are often prevented from showing reasoning abilities by pre-existing biases for social or movement cues. Results of the third experiment also support the primary importance of social cueing because in another object-choice task, individuals preferred to choose the 'socially marked' container (touching, gaze alternation) to the remotely moved one when they had no visual information about the location of the toy. Keywords: cognition; decision by exclusion; deduction; dog; reasoning Despite the wide range of studies based on human and animal cognition published in the past decades, the evolutionary emergence of reasoning abilities including different types of logical reasoning in humans continues to be a puzzle for cognitive science (Wright 2001). The fundamental question is whether an observed problemsolving behaviour is a result of gradual development in performance due to learning processes or is a sudden solution emerging from mental reorganization of problem elements (i.e. insight: Köhler 1925). In distinguishing between learning and reasoning, many assume that even though the more parsimonious learning processes can never be fully excluded (Heyes 1993), reasoning can be presumed if the subject shows an 'insightful solution' immediately (i.e. shows adequate behaviour without explicit training) in the first few trials (Premack 1995).To test for reasoning one may present a problem and provide sufficient but indirect information to solve it. One way to study the reasoning abilities is the Piagetian object permanence paradigm. In the invisible displacement task, no direct cues specify that the desired reward has moved behind the screen (i.e. the subject does not witness the reward being dropped). The subject must infer, upon seeing the empty container, that the object has been transferred. Previous studies with several species showed that some primates (e.g. orang-utans, Pongo pygmaeus: de Blois et al. 1998; o...

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Reasoning and Problem Solving

Halford¹,

Andrews²

2007

Handbook of Child Psychology

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Reconceptualizing the Transitive Inference Ability: A Framework for Existing and Future Research

Cited by 35 publications

References 58 publications

Transitivity for height versus speed: To what extent do the under-7s really have a transitive capacity?

Transitivity for height versus speed: To what extent do the under-7s really have a transitive capacity?

Dog-logic: inferential reasoning in a two-way choice task and its restricted use

Reasoning and Problem Solving

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