This paper introduces the logic of evidence and truth LET F as an extension of the Belnap-Dunn four-valued logic F DE. LET F is a slightly modified version of the logic LET J , presented in Carnielli and Rodrigues (2017). While LET J is equipped only with a classicality operator ○, LET F is equipped with a non-classicality operator • as well, dual to ○. Both LET F and LET J are logics of formal inconsistency and undeterminedness in which the operator ○ recovers classical logic for propositions in its scope. Evidence is a notion weaker than truth in the sense that there may be evidence for a proposition α even if α is not true. As well as LET J , LET F is able to express preservation of evidence and preservation of truth. The primary aim of this paper is to propose a probabilistic semantics for LET F where statements P (α) and P (○α) express, respectively, the amount of evidence available for α and the degree to which the evidence for α is expected to behave classically-or non-classically for P (•α). A probabilistic scenario is paracomplete when P (α) + P (¬α) < 1, and paraconsistent when P (α) + P (¬α) > 1, and in both cases, P (○α) < 1. If P (○α) = 1, or P (•α) = 0, classical probability is recovered for α. The proposition ○α ∨ •α, a theorem of LET F , partitions what we call the information space, and thus allows us to obtain some new versions of known results of standard probability theory.