a b s t r a c tHuman adults incline toward moral objectivism but may approach things more relativistically if different cultures are involved. In this study, 4-, 6-, and 9-year-old children (N = 136) witnessed two parties who disagreed about moral matters: a normative judge (e.g., judging that it is wrong to do X) and an antinormative judge (e.g., judging that it is okay to do X). We assessed children's metaethical judgment, that is, whether they judged that only one party (objectivism) or both parties (relativism) could be right. We found that 9-year-olds, but not younger children, were more likely to judge that both parties could be right when a normative ingroup judge disagreed with an antinormative extraterrestrial judge (with different preferences and background) than when the antinormative judge was another ingroup individual. This effect was not found in a comparison case where parties disagreed about the possibility of different physical laws. These findings suggest that although young children often exhibit moral objectivism, by early school age they begin to temper their objectivism with culturally relative metaethical judgments.Ó 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
IntroductionChildren are born into a world full of human-made laws (e.g., moral or conventional norms) and natural laws (e.g., gravity) and start to make sense of them descriptively during infancy http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2017.07.008 0022-0965/Ó 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
⇑ Corresponding author.E-mail address: marco.schmidt@psy.lmu.de (M. F. H. Schmidt).
Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 164 (2017) 163-177
Contents lists available at ScienceDirectJournal of Experimental Child Psychology jo urnal homepage: www.elsevier.co m/locate/jecp (Baillargeon, Li, Gertner, & Wu, 2011;Dahl & Tran, 2016;Diesendruck & Markson, 2011;Hamlin, 2013;Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011). During early childhood, children proactively infer, construct, and reason about human-made norms (Göckeritz, Schmidt, & Tomasello, 2014;Kalish, 1998;Killen & Smetana, 2015;Schmidt, Butler, Heinz, & Tomasello, 2016;Schmidt, Rakoczy, Mietzsch, & Tomasello, 2016;Turiel, 1983). And regarding prototypical moral norms (e.g., pertaining to the welfare of agents), research suggests that preschoolers apply these rather universally, treat them as unchangeable entities, and regard moral violations as more severe than conventional transgressions (Dahl & Kim, 2014;Killen & Smetana, 2015;Schmidt, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2012;Turiel, 1983;Turiel & Dahl, 2016). These early normative attitudes toward others' actions, however, pertain to first-order normative judgments-that is, judging actions and intentions as right or wrong according to a certain standard or norm (Schmidt & Rakoczy, in press). In the current study, we investigated children's developing capacity to make judgments about such first-order judgments (e.g., ''Xing is wrong!") in contexts of disagreement, that is, second-order judgments about whether only one person or two persons can be right about an issue on ...