2015
DOI: 10.1080/17531055.2015.1105442
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‘Recycling oil money': procurement politics and (un)productive entrepreneurship in South Sudan

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Cited by 17 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…Second, we consider a distinctive and novel set of outcomes over an extended period of time, namely the size and importance of the private business networks associated with individual politicians, including measures of network centrality that capture their influence within the network of business-owners. In so doing, we provide support to existing work, largely of a qualitative nature in Mozambique and beyond (e.g., Hanlon, 2002;Twijnstra, 2015;Macuane et al, 2018), which contends politicians frequently act as unproductive rentier-brokers, captured by the metaphor of the 'big man' straddling private and public interests (e.g., Szeftel, 2000). Third, we demonstrate how publicly-available information from (digital) business registries, which have the advantage of near-universal coverage of the formal sector, can be deployed to investigate substantive political economy questions.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 65%
“…Second, we consider a distinctive and novel set of outcomes over an extended period of time, namely the size and importance of the private business networks associated with individual politicians, including measures of network centrality that capture their influence within the network of business-owners. In so doing, we provide support to existing work, largely of a qualitative nature in Mozambique and beyond (e.g., Hanlon, 2002;Twijnstra, 2015;Macuane et al, 2018), which contends politicians frequently act as unproductive rentier-brokers, captured by the metaphor of the 'big man' straddling private and public interests (e.g., Szeftel, 2000). Third, we demonstrate how publicly-available information from (digital) business registries, which have the advantage of near-universal coverage of the formal sector, can be deployed to investigate substantive political economy questions.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 65%
“…Outside partners must state clearly to the commercial actors within the jurisdiction which they really expect them to engage with South Sudanese law through its amendments, by including all the payments in a single designed oil account and ensuring that the contracts express required compliance through all parties within the country's laws. This definitely transparent as far as the oil production is influenced (Twijnstra, 2015).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 91%
“…In the case of Uganda, for instance, Hickey & Izama (2016) have argued that a dominant developmental coalition, led by President Yoweri Museveni and the ruling National Resistance Movement, have accounted for the development of bureaucratic capacity and political leverage that have set the country's oil industry towards a developmental path. The central premise of this argument has been replicated to explain the successes and failures of oil-led governance in countries ranging from South Sudan, in relation to procurement reforms (Twijnstra, 2015), to the micropolitics of oil in Ghana (Mohan et al, 2017).…”
Section: (De)criminalizing Political Agencymentioning
confidence: 98%