REDD+ as a Public Policy Dilemma: Understanding Conflict and Cooperation in the Design of Conservation Incentives

Abstract

Command-and-control policies are often criticized as insufficient to tackle tropical deforestation. Over the past two decades, both academics and policy-makers have promoted incentive-based policies, notably REDD+ (Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation), as attractive alternatives to curb forest loss, while also potentially contributing to the poverty reduction of forest-dwelling populations. Governments have been the driving force behind the largest incentive-based forest conservation programs in Latin America. Many science-based recommendations on how to design effective incentive-based policies have, however, not found much resonance within policy circles. To understand the gap between recommendations and practice, it is important to analyze how these schemes are designed towards achieving environmental and non-environmental outcomes. To this end, we analyzed the comprehensive history of governance dynamics behind two government-led incentive schemes in Ecuador and Peru. We found that electoral interests and bureaucratic politics exerted pressure on policy design teams, which eventually traded off long-term societal efficiency concerns against short-term administrative goals. Priority was often given to non-environmental concerns, due to perceptions of political feasibility, the influence of non-environmental government agencies, and beliefs in particular government roles or public response. These findings are especially relevant for scholars studying the design, implementation and impacts of incentive-based conservation policies, and for practitioners aiming to enhance policy efficiency.

What influences the implementation of natural climate solutions? A systematic map and review of the evidence

“…Political factors often appeared together in the literature, together with institutional factors. Poor leadership often resulted in poor coordination between vertically and horizontally, unclear authority, weak enforcement, lack of policy consistency, and overlapping or misaligned regulations (Korhonen-Kurki et al 2016, Rosa Da Conceição et al 2018, Chia et al 2019. Implementation was also limited with NCS activities where not a priority for those in power, where decisions were made with short-term objectives in mind, or those in power did not have the technical expertise needed to participate fully in the REDD+ process, but continued to do so for political reasons.…”

“…Good MRV was contingent on available resources, such as technological or labor capacities. Communitybased monitoring approaches also were used to build participation and ownership for projects among IPLCs (Newton et al 2015, Rosa Da Conceição et al 2018. Land-use planning-mapping, identification of land-use drivers, and assessment of ecological conditions-came up almost as often as MRV (n = 39).…”

Ending slavery by decarbonisation? Exploring the nexus of modern slavery, deforestation, and climate change action via REDD+

“…In order to prevent REDD+ for becoming 'just another development project' [49] -or as other critics have suggested a 'conservation fad' [82,83] -the advancement of local multisector bottom-up action is necessary to establish foundational coordination, mobilize funding and political will, and encourage collaboration. Achieving this would provide a template for more complex development issues.…”

The Performance of REDD+: From Global Governance to Local Practices

“…Correa et al [32] attribute the apparent lack of effectiveness to the distribution mechanism of the Brazilian Amazon fund that prioritized diverse organizations rather than a strategic selection of projects due to its predetermined theory of change. Rosa da Conceição et al [42] looked at REDD+ in Ecuador and Peru and the pathways of two government-led, incentive-based forest conservation and poverty reduction programs for forest-based populations. They found that political interests affected policy design, resulting in trade-offs for longer-term societal efficiency in favor of short-term administrative goals.…”