Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea?

Abstract

celebrate the 50th anniversary of the SEC. 1 A number of prominent scholars participated, and its articles have been much cited. Now, we are at it again; however, there is a difference in the mood. The natural superiority of the U.S. model for securities regulation is no longer an article of faith, and the credibility of the SEC as a financial regulator has never been lower. Commentators around the world attribute an international financial crisis to problems that began in the U.S. housing market and that were exported to the rest of the world by U.S.-based financial intermediaries. This Article will move from an examination of the SEC's responsibility for that crisis to a discussion of how financial regulation should be structured for the future. We do not purport to conduct a detailed review of the SEC's recent performance (and for that we are criticized by one of our commentators).' In our view, the enduring issue is not the success or failure of the most recent leadership at the SEC, but the comparative advantages of one institutional structure over another. What can an independent SEC do better than alternative regulatory structures-such as the consolidated financial '

Corporate Governance and Accountability

“…The SEC's reputation has suffered severely in the wake of the 2008-2009 financial crisis (Coffee and Sale 2009;Fisch 2009;Poser 2009). The agency's passivity during the collapse of Bear Stearns, its failure to detect Bernard Madoff's massive fraud, and the failure of the Consolidated Supervised Entity program for financial conglomerates have led to serious questions about the agency's competence and relevance.…”

Reformy corporate governance po kryzysie finansowym

“…Opinia taka jest niewątpliwie związana z kolejnymi kryzysami i skandalami korporacyjnymi [Fox 2003;McLean, Elkind 2003;Jackson 2008;Madsen, Vance 2009, s. 216-227], które, wstrząsając rynkami kapitałowymi, negatywnie odbijają się na zyskach inwestorów [Cheffins 2009, s. 1-66;Dujuan 2009, s. 139-152]. Kryzys nadzoru korporacyjnego ujawnia fundamentalne słabości związane z niedopasowaniem rozwiązań do współczesnych wyzwań, zagrożeń i procesów globalizacyjnych oraz z fragmentarycznym prawem [Kirkpatrick 2009;Coffee 2008]. Co więcej, prowadzone analizy często kwestionują efektywność wielu rozwiązań (np.…”

Cultural Differences between U.S. Federal Financial Regulators and Implications for Interagency Collaboration

“…To reconcile this, the disclosure system has been a valuable tool. It has placed fewer burdens on firms than a system relying heavily on direct regulation, while facilitating enforcement for investor protection (Coffee 2009;Cox and Thomas 2003;Seligman 2003).…”

“…17 It also has avoided forcing solutions to market disputes, showing a hands-off approach and letting market competition resolve the disputes. 18 Additionally, the agency's major regulatory tools emphasize the prevention of excessive concentration of market powers in certain actors (Bothwell 1995a;Coffee 2009) and openness to foreign competition (U.S. CFTC and U.S. SEC 2009), evidence of the agency's economist-dominated culture valuing competition.…”