efficiency) advances that if the magnitude of the gains from moving from one state of the economy to another is greater than the magnitude of the losses, then social welfare is increased by making the move even, if no actual compensation is made 12. According to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, an outcome is efficient if those that are made better off can, potentially, compensate those that were made worse off, with the resulting outcome still being Pareto optimal. The winners should, in theory, be able to compensate the losers, but there is no requirement that compensation should be effectively paid. The Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is based on the following two fundamental theorems of welfare economics 13 : "The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics: Assume that all individuals and firms are selfish price takers. Then a competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal. The Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics: Assume that all individuals and producers are selfish price takers. Then almost any Pareto optimal equilibrium conclusions reached at the doctrinal stage). For example, the economic efficiency versus justice debate that permeates the question of the objectives of competition law belongs to the jurisprudential stage as it refers to the values that should provide content to the principle of coherence in legal interpretation. We have focused elsewhere on the interaction of economics and the law at the doctrinal and adjudicative stage: Lianos, I. (2009) 'Lost in translation? Towards a theory of economic transplants', Current Legal Problems 62(1) 346-404. This study will mainly focus on the jurisprudential stage, although as I will further explain, and probably contrary to Dworkin's view, there is a considerable interplay and mutual dependence between the jurisprudential and adjudicative stages, as in reality the values pursued by the specific legal system are function of a comparative institutional analysis performed at the adjudicative stage. However, for the adepts of a normative perspective in EU competition law, the two stages are clearly separated, with the adjudicative stage being locked in to decisions made at the jurisprudential stage. 11 One could advance a growth-related theory of competition law emphasizing the supply side, instead of the demand side (consumers). There is evidence that competition increases the chances of innovation and growth: Arrow, K (1962) 'Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Inventions', in (R. Nelson ed.) The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, NBER (noting that a monopolist that is not exposed to actual or potential competition has less incentive to invest in R&D than a firm in a competitive industry);