Redistributive policies with heterogeneous social preferences of voters

Dhami, Sanjit; al‐Nowaihi, Ali

doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2010.01.001

Cited by 24 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…This would complicate the algebra, but it turns out that our theoretical conclusions would not be affected. 12 For a model of distributive politics that uses a different kind of other-regarding preferences (in which people have a concern for fairness) see Dhami and al Nowaihi (2010). 13 The choice of quasi-linear preferences (meaning that the optimal consumption of a public good does not depend on individual wealth and therefore the cross-derivative with respect to the public and private good is not relevant) is standard in the literature.…”

Section: A Simple Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Legislators' behaviour and electoral rules: Evidence from an Italian reform

Albanese

Cioffi

Tommasino

2019

European Journal of Political Economy

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We explore how electoral rules and cultural traits (namely, the degree of civicness) interact in shaping elected officials' behaviour. We use a dataset that includes the expenditure proposals sponsored by members of the Italian Senate from 1993 to 2012 (as well as other individual and district characteristics) and exploit the 2005 electoral reform that transformed a mainly majoritarian system into a proportional one. As a first step, we can confirm previous empirical findings: legislators elected in first-past-the-post districts show a higher propensity to sponsor locally-oriented bills and to put effort into legislative activity than those elected with a closed-list proportional system. More importantly, however, we find that the effects of the change in the electoral rules are muted in areas with a high degree of civicness. We also propose a simple theoretical probabilistic voting model with altruistic preferences that is able to rationalize this finding.

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Section: A Simple Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Legislators' behaviour and electoral rules: Evidence from an Italian reform

Albanese

Cioffi

Tommasino

2019

European Journal of Political Economy

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“…Pinpointing the exact reason, with a larger data set, is likely to be an interesting question for future research to address. 24 Chen and Li (2009) measure the actual sizes of α I , α O , but in order to do so they require the extra assumption that subjects play a mixed strategy in which each pure strategy is played with a probability given by the logistic form. We do not require such an assumption.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The cut‐off value of

β_{S} = \frac{1}{2}

follows from the linear form of Fehr–Schmidt preferences. If we use the non‐linear form of Fehr–Schmidt preferences, as in Dhami and al‐Nowaihi (2010a,b), then we are likely to get continuous dependence of the proposer's share on

β_{S}

. However, the linear model suffices to explain our empirical findings in a pedagogically convenient manner.…”

Section: The Theoretical Modelmentioning

confidence: 95%

“…This confirms the result with a student population in Chen and Li (2009) but we require fewer assumptions. 24 Recall that the dummy d 4 equals 1 if the responder is a Liberal Democrat and zero otherwise; where the omitted category is the Conservative responder identity. Thus, Liberal Democrat responders, relative to Conservative responders, state a lower MAO, which is significant in 4 out of the 5 regressions reported in Table 6, although in the best regression in terms of AIC, this difference is not significant.…”

Section: Green Labour Lib Demmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…2007). Further, the Fehr–Schmidt model is particularly suitable to a theoretical analysis of redistribution (Dhami and al‐Nowaihi 2010a,b). We show in this paper that the Fehr–Schmidt model can also be extended easily to account for social identity concerns, as in Akerlof and Kranton (2000).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Identity and Redistribution: Theory and Evidence

2020

Self Cite

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We propose a theoretical model that embeds social identity concerns, as in Akerlof and Kranton (2000), with inequity averse preferences, as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999). We conduct an artefactual ultimatum game experiment with registered members of British political parties, for whom political identity is salient and redistribution is also likely to be salient. The empirical results are as follows. (1) Proposers and responders demonstrate ingroup-favoritism. (2) Proposers exhibit quantitatively stronger social identity effects relative to responders. (3) As redistributive taxes increase, average offers by proposers and the average minimum acceptable offers of responders (both as a proportion of income) decline by almost the same amount, suggesting a shared understanding that is characteristic of social norms. (4) Subjects experience less disadvantageous inequity from ingroup members relative to outgroup members. JEL-Codes: D010, D030.

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Fairness, social norms and the cultural demand for redistribution

Garrec

2017

Soc Choice Welf

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When studying attitudes towards redistribution, surveys show that individuals do care about fairness. They also show that the cultural environment in which people grow up affects their preferences about redistribution. In this article we include these two components of the demand for redistribution in order to develop a mechanism for the cultural transmission of the concern for fairness. The preferences of the young are partially shaped through the observation and imitation of others' choices. More specifically, observing during childhood how adults have collectively failed to implement fair redistributive policies lowers the concern during adulthood for fairness or the moral cost of not supporting fair taxation. Based on this mechanism, the model exhibits a multiplicity of history-dependent stationary states that may account for the huge and persistent differences in redistribution observed between Europe and the United States. It also explains why immigrants from countries with a preference for greater redistribution continue to support higher redistribution in their destination country.

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Redistributive policies with heterogeneous social preferences of voters

Cited by 24 publications

References 27 publications

Legislators' behaviour and electoral rules: Evidence from an Italian reform

Legislators' behaviour and electoral rules: Evidence from an Italian reform

Identity and Redistribution: Theory and Evidence

Fairness, social norms and the cultural demand for redistribution

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