Jarvis (2009) argues that ideological polarization in California's state legislature creates unique problems for the state because of the interaction between polarization and the requirement that the budget pass with a two-thirds supermajority. Thus, Jarvis argues that California should adopt a system of redistricting that produces more competitive elections in order to reduce polarization. However, that is the wrong solution. Increasing the number of competitive districts would have a minimal effect on polarization because polarization has other causes. Instead, the solution is to abandon the two-thirds budget requirement since polarization cannot be solved through redistricting, and increasing the number of competitive districts simply reduces representation. In several previous papers (Buchler 2005(Buchler , 2007a(Buchler , 2007b, I argued that promoting competitive elections makes elected officials less representative of their constituents' preferences and interests. Jarvis (2009) acknowledges that minimizing the number of competitive elections promotes representation, but argues that there are more important concerns than representation in California. In order for a budget to be approved by the state legislature, each chamber must pass the budget with a two-thirds supermajority rather than a simple majority. When two ideologically polarized parties must somehow cobble together a two-thirds supermajority in order to pass a budget, problems inevitably ensue. Hence, Jarvis argues that California should sacrifice representation in order to reduce polarization because the interaction between an ideologically polarized legislature, a two-thirds supermajority requirement, and several other factors causes too many problems.
KEYWORDS: competition, redistricting, polarization, budget
Journal ofIn order to reduce polarization, Jarvis (2009) argues that California should adopt a system of redistricting that creates more competitive districts. The premise of that argument is a common one. The post-2000 census round of redistricting in California was a classic example of a bipartisan gerrymander. In a bipartisan gerrymander, voters of each party are packed into relatively homogenous districts, thus guaranteeing each party a fixed number of safe seats, and eliminating any seats that might potentially be competitive in the general election. In the 2000 presidential election, 15 of California's 52 U.S. House districts had Bush and Gore separated by less than 10 points in the two-party vote. In the 2004 presidential election, only five of California's 53 House districts had Bush and Kerry separated by less than 10 points. Patterns were similar in both the Assembly and state Senate districts. Competitive districts were eliminated, and voters were packed into relatively homogenous districts that would be safe for either the Democrats or Republicans.Conventional wisdom holds that such bipartisan gerrymanders are responsible for ideological polarization in the legislature. After all, if legislators have no need to worry...
