Redistricting, Risk, and Representation: How Five State Gerrymanders Weathered the Tides of the 2000s

Abstract

This article uses a toy model of three ''regimes'' of legislative districting, accompanied by five state case studies from the 2000s decade, to demonstrate how measuring the impact of redistricting must be framed by two questions. First, what norm or dimension of representation is being measured? Second, what are the larger electoral conditions under which we are measuring? The article anecdotally shows how districting in five states impacted four different representation norms: bias, responsiveness, competitiveness, and congruence. On several of these dimensions, the success of a gerrymander depends on the national balance of tides in favor of one party in the specific cycle being measured. Especially of note, there is evidence that aggressive partisan gerrymanders perform poorly on most normative dimensions during closely contested elections, but represent voters much better under strong tides adverse to the districting party.

Public Confidence in the Redistricting Process

“…State redistricting processes may be thought of as being aligned along a “continuum of increasing separation from a legislative conflict of interest” (Cain 2012, 1818), from legislative redistricting to independent commissions. As noted by Goedert (2014), independent commissions are typically considered the most fair by reform groups, precisely because of this separation from legislative self-interest. Nevertheless, the most widespread redistricting processes currently in practice give the responsibility for drawing district lines to the legislature alone, although several states employ some form of mixed procedures.…”