Reducing Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe

Pomper, Miles A.; Potter, William C.; Sokov, Nikolai

doi:10.1080/00396331003612497

Cited by 9 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…However, the concern amongst NATO, and especially US planners, is that unilateral withdrawal of US tactical weapons Á which may make strategic and political sense to many Á needs to be seen in the wider context of US Á Russian relations, and as part of further efforts to reduce the threat from nuclear weapons more broadly. As Oliver Thranert (2009) Thranert's thoughts have been echoed by many, including Miles Pomper et al (2010) who have argued that there would be 'no guarantee that unilateral withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Europe would lead Moscow to change its position' (p. 88). The issue is complicated by the fact that Russia currently maintains around 2000 operational nuclear weapons in Europe, and overall around 5000 in other parts of its territory, as opposed to the 150Á200 or so deployed by NATO in the region (Pomper et al 2010).…”

Section: Russia Bmd Cooperation and Future Nuclear Arms Reductionsmentioning

confidence: 95%

“…As Oliver Thranert (2009) Thranert's thoughts have been echoed by many, including Miles Pomper et al (2010) who have argued that there would be 'no guarantee that unilateral withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Europe would lead Moscow to change its position' (p. 88). The issue is complicated by the fact that Russia currently maintains around 2000 operational nuclear weapons in Europe, and overall around 5000 in other parts of its territory, as opposed to the 150Á200 or so deployed by NATO in the region (Pomper et al 2010). However, it is not just the numbers of TNW held by each side that make such a move complicated but the utility placed on these weapons.…”

Section: Russia Bmd Cooperation and Future Nuclear Arms Reductionsmentioning

confidence: 95%

See 1 more Smart Citation

NATO, ballistic missile defense and the future of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe

Futter¹

2011

European Security

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Section: Russia Bmd Cooperation and Future Nuclear Arms Reductionsmentioning

confidence: 95%

Section: Russia Bmd Cooperation and Future Nuclear Arms Reductionsmentioning

confidence: 95%

NATO, ballistic missile defense and the future of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe

Futter¹

2011

European Security

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…This issue is potentially important for NATO's nuclear posture: '… if the aircraft is replaced, the significant financial and industrial investment will make the US and NATO reluctant to contemplate changes in its existing nuclear posture for a long time'. 48 These aircraft are near retirement, which would make a dual-capable F-35 attractive for some NATO allies, since the ageing DCAs have limited military value as nuclear delivery systems. It is difficult to predict when this capability would become operational.…”

Section: The B-61 Lepmentioning

confidence: 99%

Revisiting France's nuclear exception after its ‘return’ to NATO

Hlatky

2014

Journal of Transatlantic Studies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In 2009, President Nicolas Sarkozy decided that France should return to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's (NATO) integrated military structure, which it had left in 1966. Sarkozy also restated the complete independence of the French arsenal, the policy of non-participation in NATO's nuclear mission: the nuclear exception. This article takes the view that this policy of nuclear exception is outdated and potentially damaging to French interests within NATO. This is so under two scenarios: (1) As long as American non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) are on European soil, NATO's nuclear posture will evolve without official French input. (2) If these nuclear weapons were to be removed from Europe, France would stand as the predominant nuclear power among the European Union states. Since the consequences of removal would impact French interests directly, it seems unwise for Paris to opt out of this debate.

show abstract

“…121 Official US and alliance policy is open to reductions in-and the eventual elimination of-US and Russian non-strategic nuclear forces (NSNF), subject to negotiations. It is nonetheless noteworthy that some proponents of negotiated reductions in US and Russian NSNF hold that the reductions process should not lead to the elimination of US nuclear weapons in Europe in 'the foreseeable future'.…”

Section: Should Negotiations With Russia Lead To the Complete Withdramentioning

confidence: 99%

The US debate on NATO nuclear deterrence

Yost¹

2011

International Affairs

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The US debate on NATO nuclear deterrence since 1991 has been a barely visible and sometimes entirely behind-the-scenes contest between the traditional view, which is supportive of longstanding US and NATO policy, and the diverse views of various proponents of change. The principle of maintaining a credible NATO nuclear deterrence posture has continued to command widespread support. Most of the current controversy concerns how to maintain such a posture and, above all, whether nuclear risk-and responsibility-sharing arrangements involving US nuclear weapons in Europe should be sustained. These nuclear risk-and responsibility-sharing arrangements began in the late 1950s, and some US weapons must be retained in Europe if this sharing is to continue in the form in which it was then established and has since been developed.Owing to the longstanding importance of nuclear risk-and responsibilitysharing, different views on the future of the US nuclear weapons presence in Europe have come to represent different broader positions. Some Americans have come to see maintaining US nuclear weapons in Europe as irrelevant and counterproductive, in the light of their judgements as to deterrence and assurance requirements, while others have seen continuing utility in nuclear risk-and responsibility-sharing and associated arrangements. The US nuclear weapons in Europe have, in other words, been perceived through different analytical lenses. The prudence of sustaining-or unilaterally removing, without any Russian reciprocity-the remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe has therefore become one of the key issues in dispute. The somewhat artificial focus on US nuclear weapons in Europe has persisted, despite the fact that there are other important issues related to US extended deterrence. The extension by Washington of a credible umbrella of deterrence protection also depends on US intercontinental forces, missile defences, non-nuclear capabilities, declaratory policy, strategic targeting policy, and relations with the NATO allies, among other factors. * The views expressed are the author's alone and do not represent those of the Department of the Navy or any US government agency. The author presented an earlier version of this article at a conference entitled 'The future of NATO deterrence policy', organized by the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique, Paris, on 26 May 2011. Thanks are owed to those who commented on drafts of this article, including

show abstract

Reducing Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe

Cited by 9 publications

References 0 publications

NATO, ballistic missile defense and the future of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe

NATO, ballistic missile defense and the future of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe

Revisiting France's nuclear exception after its ‘return’ to NATO

The US debate on NATO nuclear deterrence

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About