2006
DOI: 10.1007/11799313_11
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Reducing the Space Complexity of BDD-Based Attacks on Keystream Generators

Abstract: Abstract. The main application of stream ciphers is online-encryption of arbitrarily long data, for example when transmitting speech data between a Bluetooth headset and a mobile GSM phone or between the phone and a GSM base station. Many practically used and intensively discussed stream ciphers such as the E0 generator used in Bluetooth and the GSM cipher A5/1 consist of a small number of linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs) that transform a secret key x ∈ {0, 1} n into an output keystream of arbitrary len… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
3
1

Citation Types

0
12
0

Year Published

2006
2006
2014
2014

Publication Types

Select...
4
3

Relationship

1
6

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 13 publications
(12 citation statements)
references
References 16 publications
0
12
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Later research [19,33] showed the effectiveness of BDD-based attacks on stream ciphers (albeit, they generally require a large amount of memory). Krause notes that one of the effective ways to disrupt BDD-based attacks is for the Boolean function combiner of the stream cipher is to have a robust BDD.…”
Section: Two Particular Cases Based On the Hwbf And Carlet-feng Funcmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Later research [19,33] showed the effectiveness of BDD-based attacks on stream ciphers (albeit, they generally require a large amount of memory). Krause notes that one of the effective ways to disrupt BDD-based attacks is for the Boolean function combiner of the stream cipher is to have a robust BDD.…”
Section: Two Particular Cases Based On the Hwbf And Carlet-feng Funcmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…If 2 37 bits keystream and 2 28 bytes memory are available, our attack on one-level Bluetooth E0 has a time complexity 2 35.1 operations after a pre-computation of 2 49 operations. Compared with the previous attacks in [8,[19][20][21][22][23][24][25][26], this is the best attack against one-level Bluetooth E0 known so far. Our attack on LILI-128 works in 2 70.6 operations after a pre-computation of 2 36.9 operations, given only 2 24 -bit keystream and 2 24.5 -byte memory, which is also among the best known attack against LILI-128 [21,25,[27][28][29][30][31].…”
mentioning
confidence: 91%
“…They might be efficient against LFSR-based generators [20,21,34,35]. To resist BDD-based attacks, a Boolean function should have a high BDD size.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%