2005
DOI: 10.1002/jid.1193
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Reducing vulnerability: the demand for microinsurance

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Cited by 82 publications
(47 citation statements)
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“…A suitable insurance product needs to account for all such factors. A mere downscaling of insurance products known in developed insurance markets will not create sufficient willingness to pay for microinsurance (see Cohen & Sebstad, 2005). The consequence of a lack of trust and other factors reducing the perceived value from a customer's perspective is that willingness to pay would be potentially lower than the technical insurance premium and result in low take-up rates.…”
Section: Interaction Of Premiums Demand and Behaviormentioning
confidence: 98%
“…A suitable insurance product needs to account for all such factors. A mere downscaling of insurance products known in developed insurance markets will not create sufficient willingness to pay for microinsurance (see Cohen & Sebstad, 2005). The consequence of a lack of trust and other factors reducing the perceived value from a customer's perspective is that willingness to pay would be potentially lower than the technical insurance premium and result in low take-up rates.…”
Section: Interaction Of Premiums Demand and Behaviormentioning
confidence: 98%
“…Likewise, governments raise post-disaster capital by diverting funds from other budgeted programs, borrowing money domestically, or taking loans from international financial institutions. While many locally based funding sources, for example, borrowing from neighbours or family, appear to work reasonably well for small localized events (Cohen and Sebstad 2003), they are problematic for catastrophes that affect large regions or many persons at the same time (so-called co-variant or systemic risks). To hedge against co-variant risks, households may purposely locate family members outside of harms way or diversify their livelihoods.…”
Section: Well Insured Group Well Insured Groupmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Yet, although informal financing appears to work reasonably well for low-loss events, it is often unreliable and inadequate for catastrophic events. 10 At the public level, it is well known that if governments can spread their post-disaster costs over a large tax base, or other lower-cost financing strategies, they should be risk neutral and not purchase insurance. 11 However, in the aftermath of heavy devastation in their countries, lowincome developing countries may face exhausted tax bases, little reserves and declining credit ratings making external borrowing difficult.…”
Section: Disaster Risk Financing In Developing Countriesmentioning
confidence: 99%