Reduction

McCauley, Robert N.

doi:10.1016/b978-044451540-7/50021-9

Cited by 91 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…47 Many scientists are not interested in reducing other levels of science; they are looking for whatever help they can find from the confirmation or disconfirmation of their own theories by other ones. 48 They want to find ways to expand and understand their own findings in other contexts and explore ways to refine their own theories so that they can be a more accurate representation of whatever phenomenon they are trying to study. Scientific progress would be greatly impoverished if, whenever there was a discrepancy between two different interlevel theories, one theory was simply eliminated in favor of another one.…”

Section: Inter-versus Intra-level Reductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…41 Looking at the history of science, an important distinction can be made between inter-level and intra-level reduction in the hierarchy of sciences. 42 The most common type of reduction in science is intra-level reduction, which refers to theory replacement or change that occurs over time within a particular level of a science.…”

Section: Inter-versus Intra-level Reductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In many cases, lower-level sciences must appeal to findings from higher-level sciences to support their own conclusions. 44 In the case of the cognitive neurosciences, descriptions of brain activity provided by the neurosciences, which are intended to describe some facet of psychological phenomena, often require behavioral descriptions at the psychological level to define exactly what type of phenomenon the neurosciences are trying to describe. For example, the dopamine hypothesis, 45 as an account of the epidemiology of schizophrenic behavior, is dependent upon a higher-level description of what schizophrenia is in the first place.…”

Section: Inter-versus Intra-level Reductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Challenging the By-Product Theory of Religion in the Cognitive Science of Religion

Slyke¹

2010

Theology and Science

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The by-product theory of religion in the cognitive science of religion is problematic on both scientific and philosophical grounds. The by-product theory of religion argues that the explanation for religious beliefs can be reduced to a by-product of the unconscious processes of evolutionary cognitive adaptations. At the scientific level, the concept of emergence describes processes related to religious beliefs that are not causally reducible to cognitive adaptations. At the philosophical level, the by-product theory is often associated with certain metaphysical assumptions about the non-existence of supernatural beings, which is not warranted based on the empirical evidence alone. In general, evidence from the cognitive science of religion does not necessitate the elimination of theological explanations of religious beliefs and theology can act as a competing interpretative framework for the empirical findings at the levels of cognitive and evolutionary science.The by-product theory of religion in the cognitive science of religion (CSR) claims that religious beliefs and behaviors are ultimately reducible to a by-product of evolutionary cognitive adaptations. This view of religion is problematic on two counts. First, evidence from a wide range of sources in the cognitive neurosciences demonstrates that the by-product theory is unable to account for a number of important causal processes in the formation and function of religious beliefs. The by-product theory characterizes religious phenomena from a causally reductive perspective which assumes that causation is primarily bottom-up from part to whole. However, an emergent view of cognition provides a better account of the multiple causal factors involved in religious beliefs.Secondly, the by-product theory is often assumed to indicate that any theological explanation of religious belief is invalidated through the process of eliminative reduction. Thus, the real explanation for religious beliefs is at the level of cognitive and evolutionary science, not higher-level descriptions offered by religious studies or theology. However, the problem here lies in a lack of discrimination between scientific and metaphysical statements. Metaphysical

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Section: Inter-versus Intra-level Reductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Inter-versus Intra-level Reductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Inter-versus Intra-level Reductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Challenging the By-Product Theory of Religion in the Cognitive Science of Religion

Slyke¹

2010

Theology and Science

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“…There are two major obstacles in the way of achieving a successful reduction of psychology to neurophysiology: multiple realizations and consciousness (see, e.g., Polger, 2004;McCauley, 2007;Rakover, 2007). According to the former, psychological states can be realized by multiple neurophysiological states (e.g., fear is realized in different animals).…”

Section: A Possible Reason For the Measurement Problem In Psychologymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…(For criticisms of Hacking's approach, see Cooper, 2004. ) 5) In a review chapter, McCauley (2007) criticized the multiple realization and the consciousness arguments against reduction. Although the discussion of these topics is beyond the scope of the present paper, it should be mentioned that the criticisms do not seem to deliver these arguments the coup de grace.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Psychology as an Associational Science: A Methodological Viewpoint

Rakover¹

2012

OJPP

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Unlike the sciences (physics), psychology has not developed in any of its areas (such as perception, learning, cognition) a top-theory like Newtonian theory, the theory of relativity, or quantum theory in physics. This difference is explained by a methodological discrepancy between the sciences and psychology, which centers on the measurement procedure: in psychology, measurement units similar to those in physics have not been discovered. Based on the arguments supporting this claim, a methodological distinction is made between the sciences and psychology as an associational science. It is suggested that that these two kinds of science generate two different classes of technologies. The possibility that in psychology there is a connection between the issue of measurement and the unsolved consciousness/brain problem is discussed.

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Multiple realization and methodological pluralism

Richardson

2008

Synthese

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Multiple realization was once taken to be a challenge to reductionist visions, especially within cognitive science, and a foundation of the "antireductionist consensus." More recently, multiple realization has come to be challenged on naturalistic grounds, as well as on more "metaphysical" grounds. Within cognitive science, one focal issue concerns the role of neural plasticity for addressing these issues. If reorganization maintains the same cognitive functions, that supports claims for multiple realization. I take up the reorganization involved in language dysfunctions to deal with questions concerned with multiple realization and neural plasticity. Beginning with Broca's case for localization and the nineteenth century discussion of "reorganization," and returning to more recent evidence for neural plasticity, I argue that, in the end, there is substantial support for multiple realization in cognitive systems; I further argue that this is wholly consistent with a recognition of methodological pluralism in cognitive science.

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Reduction

Cited by 91 publications

References 35 publications

Challenging the By-Product Theory of Religion in the Cognitive Science of Religion

Challenging the By-Product Theory of Religion in the Cognitive Science of Religion

Psychology as an Associational Science: A Methodological Viewpoint

Multiple realization and methodological pluralism

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