Reevaluating the Middle-Class Protest Paradigm: A Case-Control Study of Democratic Protest Coalitions in Russia

Abstract

A large literature expects rising middle classes to promote democracy. However, few studies provide direct evidence on this group in nondemocratic settings. This article focuses on politically important differentiation within the middle classes, arguing that middle-class growth in state-dependent sectors weakens potential coalitions in support of democratization. I test this argument using surveys conducted at mass demonstrations in Russia and detailed population data. I also present a new approach to studying protest based on case-control methods from epidemiology. The results reveal that state-sector professionals were significantly less likely to mobilize against electoral fraud, even after controlling for ideology. If this group had participated at the same rate as middle-class professionals from the private sector, I estimate that another 90,000 protesters would have taken to the streets. I trace these patterns of participation to the interaction of individual resources and selective incentives. These findings have implications for authoritarian stability and democratic transitions.

Creating Democratic Citizens: Political Effects of the Internet in China

“…Taking advantages of recent developments in causal mediation analysis (Imai et al, 2011;1 For instance, many studies suggest that it is the social groups' dependence on the state that fundamentally shapes their democratic support and mobilization against authoritarian regimes (also see, Chen and Lu, 2011;Rosenfeld, 2017). Imai and Yamamoto, 2013), we investigate how the Internet usage affects ordinary Chinese people's political support (i.e., evaluation of government performance and affective support for the Communist regime) with and without inducing their democratic commitment (i.e., indirect and direct effects).…”

Affect and Autocracy: Emotions and Attitudes in Russia after Crimea

“…Nevertheless, attention is starting to shift away from institutions and elites and towards the interaction between those elites and society at large -although even here the emphasis remains largely materialist, focusing on economic sentiment (Magaloni 2006;Treisman 2011) or social class (Roberts and Arce 1998). In Russia specifically, economic factors have figured strongly in explanations of mass support (Rosenfeld 2017;White and McAllister 2008).…”

When Does Diffusing Protest Lead to Local Organization Building? Evidence from a Comparative Subnational Study of Russia’s “For Fair Elections” Movement

“…The choice of the latter variable reflects that both firm size and state ownership are strong predictors of political loyalty of employers (Frye, Reuter, and Szakonyi 2014), suggesting that small, private firms are the most likely sponsors for oppositional activity (thus making regional politics less dependent on politically controlled clientelist structures). In addition, both higher income levels and a larger non-state sector may increase the supply of available activists (Rosenfeld 2017).…”