Reference and Contingency

Evans, Gareth

doi:10.5840/monist197962220

Cited by 244 publications

(95 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…These two senses are familiar from the distinction between deep and shallow necessity drawn by Evans (1979) and Davies and Humberstone (1980). Slightly simplified, a sentence φ is shallowly necessary if and only if:…”

Section: Contingency and Invariancementioning

confidence: 99%

Characterizing Invariance

Woods¹

2017

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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I argue that in order to apply the most common type of criteria for logicality, invariance criteria, to natural language, we need to consider both invariance of content-modeled by functions from contexts into extensions-and invariance of character-modeled, à la Kaplan, by functions from contexts of use into contents. Logical expressions should be invariant in both senses. If we do not require this, then old objections due to Timothy McCarthy and William Hanson, suitably modified, demonstrate that content invariant expressions can display intuitive marks of non-logicality. If we do require this, we neatly avoid these objections while also managing to demonstrate desirable connections of logicality to necessity. The resulting view is more adequate as a demarcation of the logical expressions of natural language.

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Section: Contingency and Invariancementioning

confidence: 99%

Characterizing Invariance

Woods¹

2017

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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“…(AK) both explains and legitimates this systematic tendency, in a very tidy way. Evans (1985) and Hawthorne (2002), for example, do not cite (4) as an example of the contingent a priori, but rather (19).…”

Section: Conditionalsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Presupposition and the a priori

Charlow

2012

Philos Stud

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“…For example, consider Evans' descriptive name 'Julius', introduced for whoever invented the zip (Evans 1979). The primary intension of 'Julius' picks out whoever invented the zip in a given scenario, while its secondary intension picks out the actual inventor (William C. Whitworth) in all worlds.…”

Section: Two-dimensional Semanticsmentioning

confidence: 99%