Referential Intentions: A Response to Buchanan and Peet

Unnsteinsson, Elmar

doi:10.1080/00048402.2018.1432666

Cited by 5 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…This could have been the end of the story if it were not for a recent paper by Unnsteinsson (2018a) from which one can extract the following criticism: Buchanan’s appeal to intention recognition is not adequately explanatory since it does nothing to explain why our intuitions on communicative success seem to change so drastically when we let go of one of the assumptions made in the previous Loar‐cases – namely, that hearer and speaker are ignorant of some relevant identity fact. According to Unnsteinsson’s proposal, one’s account of successful communication must give a much more central role to the presence or absence of false distinctness beliefs such as those that Smith and Jones hold about the man on the TV and the man on the train.…”

Section: Communicative Success and Identity Of Truth‐conditionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Unlike Loar‐case 1, where our intuitions weighed heavily in favour of communicative failure, Loar‐case 2 is constructed in such a way that our intuitions, by themselves, do not seem to point decisively either way. As Unnsteinsson (2018a) suggests, a good way to begin answering this question is by reflecting on what Smith’s reaction would be if he noticed that Jones never realized he was pointing at the television. Here is one natural possibility about what would happen: nothing.…”

Section: The Relevance Of False Distinctness Beliefs: Against Unnsteimentioning

confidence: 99%

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On Successful Communication, Intentions and False Beliefs

Valente

2019

Theoria

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I discuss a criterion for successful communication between a speaker and a hearer put forward by Buchanan according to which there is communicative success only if the hearer entertains, as a result of interpreting the speaker’s utterance, a thought that has the same truth conditions as the thought asserted by the speaker and, furthermore, does so in virtue of recognizing the speaker’s communicative intentions. I argue, against Buchanan, that the data on which it is based are compatible with a view involving Fregean modes of presentation. In the second part of the article I critically discuss Unnsteinsson’s claim that communicative success depends on the absence of contextually salient false distinctness beliefs about the subject matter of the conversation. I argue that this thesis leads to clearly counterintuitive consequences and that no fundamental role must be given to the presence or absence of false distinctness beliefs in one’s account of successful communication. The upshot is that we should stick with Buchanan’s criterion. I conclude by employing Strawson and Recanati’s concepts of linking and merging to show how the criterion I favour is compatible with the fact that, when subjects hold no relevant false distinctness beliefs, communicative success does not seem to be disrupted by the hearer seemingly failing to recognize the speaker’s intentions.

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Section: Communicative Success and Identity Of Truth‐conditionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Relevance Of False Distinctness Beliefs: Against Unnsteimentioning

confidence: 99%

On Successful Communication, Intentions and False Beliefs

Valente

2019

Theoria

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“…(Buchanan 2014, fn. 13) Similarly, neither Peet (2017) nor Unnsteinsson (2018) spell out what kind of luck is involved in Loar cases or how this idea can help us generate more adequate predictions about such cases. This is the task I undertake in what follows.…”

Section: The General Problem With Swmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For instance, Buchanan (2014) applies a broadly Gricean framework to account for Loar cases without having to embrace Loar's descriptivist semantics for singular terms. Buchanan's attempt then generated responses by Peet (2017) and Unnsteinsson (2018), who also propose solutions that cannot be reduced to SW. Let us examine each of these views in turn.…”

Section: Other Approaches To Loar's Puzzlementioning

confidence: 99%

Loar’s Puzzle, Similarity, and Knowledge of Reference

Onofri

2019

Manuscrito

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In 'The Semantics of Singular Terms' (1976) Brian Loar proposed a famous case where a hearer seems to misunderstand an utterance even though he has correctly identified its referent. Loar's case has been used to defend a model of communication where speaker and hearer must think of the referent in similar ways in order for communication to succeed. This 'Similar Ways of Thinking' (SW) theory is extremely popular, both in the literature on Loar cases and in other philosophical discussions. My goal is to offer a novel argument against this influential model of communication and propose an alternative picture. First, I show how a certain version of SW fails to solve Loar's puzzle. Then I point at a more general problem with SW, arguing that no version of this model can account for Loar-style cases without making the conditions for communication too strict. I then propose an alternative account of Loar cases, analyzing them as cases of luck where the hearer does not know that she has identified the referent correctly. I conclude by contrasting my view with other existing accounts of Loar cases.

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“…Unnsteinsson () claims that the failure of communication in the case from Loar previously presented is due to the subjects having a false belief about the target of the conversation. That could be seen as a view according to which communicative success is independent of the subject's perspectives on the subject matter at hand.…”

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confidence: 99%

Communicating and Disagreeing with Distinct Concepts: A Defense of Semantic Internalism

Valente

2019

Theoria

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I suggest a solution to a conflict between semantic internalism – according to which the concepts one expresses are determined by one's use of representations – and publicity – according to which, if two subjects successfully communicate or are in genuine agreement, then they entertain thoughts constituted by the same concepts. My solution rests on the thesis that there can be successful communication and genuine agreement between thinkers employing distinct concepts as long as there is a certain relation (of conceptually guaranteed sameness of extension) between them. In section 2, I motivate semantic internalism and show how it conflicts with publicity. In section 3, I carve the logical space of possible solutions to the conflict into liberal and conservative solutions. Section 4 assesses Wikforss's conservative solution to Burge's arthritis thought‐experiment and concludes that it fails for more than one reason. Section 5 introduces a new case study involving a deferential concept. This case serves as the backdrop for my positive account offered in section 6. The conclusion of the article is preceded by a comparison of my view with another recently proposed by Recanati (section 7) and some replies to possible objections (section 8).

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Referential Intentions: A Response to Buchanan and Peet

Cited by 5 publications

References 7 publications

On Successful Communication, Intentions and False Beliefs

On Successful Communication, Intentions and False Beliefs

Loar’s Puzzle, Similarity, and Knowledge of Reference

Communicating and Disagreeing with Distinct Concepts: A Defense of Semantic Internalism

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