Reflection and Reasoning in Moral Judgment

Abstract

While there is much evidence for the influence of automatic emotional responses on moral judgment, the roles of reflection and reasoning remain uncertain. In Experiment 1, we induced subjects to be more reflective by completing the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) prior to responding to moral dilemmas. This manipulation increased utilitarian responding, as individuals who reflected more on the CRT made more utilitarian judgments. A follow-up study suggested that trait reflectiveness is also associated with increased utilitarian judgment. In Experiment 2, subjects considered a scenario involving incest between consenting adult siblings, a scenario known for eliciting emotionally driven condemnation that resists reasoned persuasion. Here, we manipulated two factors related to moral reasoning: argument strength and deliberation time. These factors interacted in a manner consistent with moral reasoning: A strong argument defending the incestuous behavior was more persuasive than a weak argument, but only when increased deliberation time encouraged subjects to reflect.

Disfluent fonts lead to more utilitarian decisions in moral dilemmas

“…Our findings are consistent with previous work demonstrating that disfluency enhances analytic thinking, thus improving performance in cognitive tasks (Alter et al, 2007;Diemand-Yauman et al, 2010;Song & Schwarz, 2008). Increased analytic thinking can also promote utilitarian responses to moral dilemmas (Bartels, 2008;Moore et al, 2008;Paxton et al, 2012). In our study, dilemmas written in disfluent fonts may have prompted analytic thinking in participants, leading to more utilitarian decisions.…”

What makes us think? A three-stage dual-process model of analytic engagement

“…Stanovich (e.g., 2004;2009b) has argued that thinking disposition is an underappreciated determinant of psychological outcomes. Recent research has supported the idea that cognitive style plays a consequential role in psychological domains that are of some general import (Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015b): e.g., creativity (Barr, Pennycook, Stolz, & Fugelsang, 2014), moral judgments and values (Paxton, Unger, & Greene, 2012;Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2014b;Rozyman, Landy, & Goodwin, 2014), religious belief (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012;Pennycook et al, 2014a;Pennycook, Cheyne, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2013;Pennycook, Ross, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2016;Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 2012), bullshit receptivity (Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2015), and even Smartphone technology use (Barr, Pennycook, Stolz, & Fugelsang, 2015 …”

Applying moral foundations theory to understanding public views of sexual offending

“…Several studies have found that fictitious cases of consensual incest evoke strong disgust reactions, even when participants are given supplementary information suggesting that there was no chance of conception and that no emotional harm would come from the incestuous encounter (GinerSorolla & Russell, 2009;Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993;Paxton, Ungar, & Greene, 2011).…”