2016
DOI: 10.1080/23792949.2016.1233072
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Reflections on China's Belt and Road Initiative

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Cited by 28 publications
(13 citation statements)
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“…In addition to the multilateral AIIB, which encompasses a wider range of member states from across Eurasia to facilitate international trade and cooperation, there are several other prominent instruments that allow China to build networks with a more select group of recipient countries. Political instruments include the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which was initially established in 2001 and consists of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India, and Pakistan (Toops, 2016); and the Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries, known as the "16+1," founded in 2012 (Matura, 2019). Interestingly, whilst touted as China's "grand geopolitical project threaten[ing] a new East-West divide in Europe" (Jakimów, 2017), in the Visions and Actions document for the BRI, the 16+1 is excluded from a long list of, principally Asian, multilateral mechanisms (including the SCO) that are set out as integral to the BRI.…”
Section: Financial Instrumentsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In addition to the multilateral AIIB, which encompasses a wider range of member states from across Eurasia to facilitate international trade and cooperation, there are several other prominent instruments that allow China to build networks with a more select group of recipient countries. Political instruments include the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which was initially established in 2001 and consists of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India, and Pakistan (Toops, 2016); and the Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries, known as the "16+1," founded in 2012 (Matura, 2019). Interestingly, whilst touted as China's "grand geopolitical project threaten[ing] a new East-West divide in Europe" (Jakimów, 2017), in the Visions and Actions document for the BRI, the 16+1 is excluded from a long list of, principally Asian, multilateral mechanisms (including the SCO) that are set out as integral to the BRI.…”
Section: Financial Instrumentsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Later, this region was developed into an energy transmission corridor between China and Central Asia. After that, Xinjiang grew into an important part of China's economic development, so it was known to be a bridgehead for China's openness and expansion in the regional structure (Toops, 2016). As such, Xinjiang province not only facilitates central government interaction with Central Asian and European countries, but also becomes the heartbeat of national energy.…”
Section: Convergence Of Interests Of Central Government and Provinciamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Это не только развитие западных регионов Китая до уровня восточных районов, но и, несомненно, модернизация Синьцзян-Уйгурского автономного района [Yu 2016]. Это можно заметить, если взглянуть на изменившуюся транспортную инфраструктуру региона [Toops 2016]. Улучшение экономической обстановки, повышение уровня жизни, создание новых рабочих мест, вовлечение местного населения в работу в рамках проекта, стимулирование торгово-экономических и энергетических обменов с республиками Центральной Азии -все это будет способствовать стабилизации обстановки в СУАР.…”
Section: влияние сирийского конфликта на политическую и экономическуюunclassified