Reflections on Power, Voting, and Voting Power

Holler, Manfred J.; Nurmi, Hannu

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_1

Cited by 7 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 79 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Different power indices measure different aspects of power and there is still a lot of research in order to answer the question which index to choose, see e.g. [17]. For a recent overview of different power indices see e.g.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The cost of getting local monotonicity

Freixas

Kurz

2016

European Journal of Operational Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Committees with yes-no-decisions are commonly modeled as simple games and the ability of a member to influence the group decision is measured by so-called power indices. For a weighted game we say that a power index satisfies local monotonicity if a player who controls a large share of the total weight vote does not have less power than a player with a smaller voting weight. In (Holler, 1982) Manfred Holler introduced the Public Good index. In its unnormalized version, i.e., the raw measure, it counts the number of times that a player belongs to a minimal winning coalition. Unlike the Banzhaf index, it does not count the remaining winning coalitions in which the player is crucial. Holler noticed that his index does not satisfy local monotonicity, a fact that can be seen either as a major drawback (Felsenthal & Machover, 1998, 221 ff.)or as an advantage (Holler & Napel 2004). In this paper we consider a convex combination of the two indices and require the validity of local monotonicity. We prove that the cost of obtaining it is high, i.e., the achievable new indices satisfying local monotonicity are closer to the Banzhaf index than to the Public Good index. All these achievable new indices are more solidary than the Banzhaf index, which makes them as very suitable candidates to divide a public good. As a generalization we consider convex combinations of either: the Shift index, the Public Good index, and the Banzhaf index, or alternatively: the Shift Deegan-Packel, Deegan-Packel, and Johnston indices.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The cost of getting local monotonicity

Freixas

Kurz

2016

European Journal of Operational Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The most popular power indices are the Banzhaf index(Banzhaf, 1965) and the Shapley-Shubik index(Shapley and Shubik, 1954). For an overview of other power indices that have been devised, the reader may refer toFelsenthal and Machover (1998),Holler and Owen (2001),Holler and Nurmi (2013).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Lack of consensus, dispersion of political power and public debt: evidence from a sample of developed countries

Mansour,

Kamwa

2024

Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The aim of this article is to study empirically the relationship between political governance and public debt by testing a number of hypotheses. We examine the effects of the dispersion of power on public debt with an econometric study carried out on a sample of 13 developed countries using macroeconomic and political data covering the period 1996–2012. It is found that the lack of consensus between political parties in a government coalition and the dispersion of power within the government are factors explaining the increase in public debt.

show abstract