2021
DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2020.0534
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Refocusing neuroscience: moving away from mental categories and towards complex behaviours

Abstract: Mental terms—such as perception, cognition, action, emotion, as well as attention, memory, decision-making—are epistemically sterile. We support our thesis based on extensive comparative neuroanatomy knowledge of the organization of the vertebrate brain. Evolutionary pressures have moulded the central nervous system to promote survival. Careful characterization of the vertebrate brain shows that its architecture supports an enormous amount of communication and integration of signals, especially in birds and ma… Show more

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Cited by 65 publications
(53 citation statements)
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“…Such an attitude of reframing old questions can be taken even further. As Luiz Pessoa, Loreta Medina and Ester Desfilis suggest, it can be used to reconsider many aspects of human psychology [ 56 ]. These authors point out that many of the basic theoretical distinctions used to discuss mental phenomena (e.g.…”
Section: The Importance Of Evolution For Understanding Ourselvesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Such an attitude of reframing old questions can be taken even further. As Luiz Pessoa, Loreta Medina and Ester Desfilis suggest, it can be used to reconsider many aspects of human psychology [ 56 ]. These authors point out that many of the basic theoretical distinctions used to discuss mental phenomena (e.g.…”
Section: The Importance Of Evolution For Understanding Ourselvesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The second general problem is that these approaches rely on the assumption that cognitive operations can be abstracted and encapsulated by stable and context independent mental state concepts such as “attention” or “cognitive control” ( Pessoa et al, 2022 )—i.e., that, for example, cognitive control measured at one time and using one paradigm relates meaningfully to cognitive control measured using a different type of paradigm, and cognitive control as it is deployed in ecological contexts ( Campbell, 1957 ; Neisser, 1977 ; Broadbent, 1993 ; Kingstone et al, 2003 , 2008 ; Doebel, 2020 ). In fact, it is rarely, if ever, tested whether experimental simulacra do actually mimic the real-world cognitive operation that they were designed to imitate (e.g., whether people who perform better at an experimental simulation of inhibition actually show better inhibition in real-world settings) ( Sonkusare et al, 2019 ).…”
Section: Introduction – the Problem: Most Current Approaches To Study...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Indeed, such abstract concepts may rarely—if ever—strictly correspond to distinct neural structures (e.g., there is no strict boundary at the neural level between “emotions” and “cognition”) ( Pessoa et al, 2022 ); rather, neural architectures appear to be geared toward solving specific problems that depend on the characteristics of the world that cognitive agents live and develop in Pessoa et al (2022) . In other words, although mental state concepts constitute useful shortcuts to talk about cognitive operations, understanding how neural systems support behavior requires research that documents how cognitive agents solve specific real-world problems.…”
Section: Introduction – the Problem: Most Current Approaches To Study...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The second general problem is that these approaches rely on the assumption that cognitive operations can be abstracted and encapsulated by stable and context independent mental state concepts such as "attention" or "cognitive control" (Pessoa et al, 2022) -i.e. that, for example, cognitive control measured at one time and using one paradigm relates meaningfully to cognitive control measured using a different type of paradigm (Broadbent, 1993;Campbell, 1957;Kingstone et al, 2003Kingstone et al, , 2008Neisser, 1977), and cognitive control as it is deployed in ecological contexts.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Indeed, such abstract concepts may rarely -if ever -strictly correspond to distinct neural structures (e.g., there is no strict boundary at the neural level between "emotions" and "cognition") (Pessoa et al, 2022); rather, neural architectures appear to be geared towards solving specific problems that depend on the characteristics of the world that cognitive agents live and develop in (Pessoa et al, 2022). In other words, although mental state concepts constitute useful shortcuts to talk about cognitive operations, understanding how neural systems support behaviour requires research that documents how cognitive agents solve specific real-world problems.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%